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PREFACE
Tliis thesis will attempt to uncover the developing international: 
structure in Southeast Asia for the next decade. For purposes of this 
writing, Southeast Asia will include Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Singapore, 
the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and South Vietnam. Initially, a 
brief survey of U.S. relations with Thailand will serve as a point of 
orientation to the emergence of the Nixon Doctrine and disengagement. 
Following this, the latest examples of Southeast Asian regionalism will 
be examined and the new quandrilateral relationship of the great powers
in the area will be viewed. The conclusions will present some specula-  -
tions as to desirable actions that great powers and nations of the area 
might initiate to contribute to stability and insure that the simultaneous 
emergence of regionalism and the quadrilateral relationship become 
compatible.
My acknowledgements for assistance in writing are to the following 
people: to Dr. Forest L. Grieves, my thesis director, who helped me
initiate the project and provided needed assistance at many impasses; to 
Dr. Louis D. Hayes, who provided insight and encouragement;: to Dr. Frank B« 
Bessac, who contributed his extensive knowledge of the many nations of the 
subject area; to Anita Lexd.s and Joy Schroeber, who typed the manuscript 
so efficiently.
August, 1971 
Missoula, Montana
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CHAPTER I
DEVELOPMENT OF THAI-U.S. RELATIONS
The Early Treaties
The first treaty ever negotiated between the United States and an 
Asian nation was made in 1833 by the Thai King, Fhra Nong Khao (Rama III), 
and Edmund Roberts, a diplomatic envoy sent to Southeast Asia by President 
Andrew Jackson.'*’ This first treaty was signed at Bangkok on March 20,
1833 and was primarily a treaty of amity and commerce. Its purposes 
were to establish a "perpetual peace" between the United States and the
-------King of Siam, and to enable the citizens of-both countries to hold com----
mercial intercourse in the ports of their respective nations,.
The Treaty of 1833 is significant not only because it was the first 
treaty concluded by the U.S. with an Asian nation, but also because it 
built friendship between the two countries as equals. There was no sug­
gestion of an encroachment on Thailand's sovereignty and this greatly im­
pressed the Thai leaders. Further, this treaty was concluded ten years 
before the treaty which established relations between the U.S. and China 
and twenty years before the one establishing relations betv/een the U.S. 
and Japan.^
However, this somewhat tranquil relationship based on equality 
did not last long. Shortly thereafter, a system of extraterritoriality
■̂ U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Background 
Notes on Thailand. Pubn. No. 796l, June, 1967, p. 4o
^Royal Thai Embassy, Office of Public Relations Attache, Thailand 
and Her Relations with the U.S., February, 1970, p. 1.
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was imposed on Japan by treaties concluded by Western nations for the 
protection of Western merchants,, Subsequently, a similar system made dis­
appearance in Thailand, and Britain led other Western powers to impose 
this system,upon the Thais in the form of a series of new treaties con­
cluded in the years of 1855 and 1 8 5 6,
The second treaty between the United States and Thailand was 
signed at Bangkok on the 19th of May, 1856, It was known as the Treaty 
of Peace, Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation,^ Mr. Townsend Harris 
signed on behalf of the United States. According to the terms of this 
treaty, a large slice of Thai sovereignty was carved away. All American 
citizens coming to Thailand were exempted from jurisdiction of the Thai 
Courts of Law; and while Thailand could impose import duty on .all-articles 
of import from the U.S., such duty was not to exceed three per.cent of the 
market value of the goods0
There seems little doubt that by these treaties with the Western 
powers of the period, Thailand was deprived of some of her rights as a 
sovereign nation— the right to administer justice to all throughout her 
kingdom and the right to levy such import tariffs as would meet her in­
creasing need for the development of her country. In her struggle to free 
herself from these treaty obligations, the Thai leaders made frequent and 
persistent efforts to have the old treaties revised; but these efforts 
were to no avail. During the latter 1800's American missionaries entered 
Thailand in small numbers and initiated reforms in education, medicine, 
and technology.
^Ibld,
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Further, about 1900, King Chulalongkom employed advisors from 
the Harvard Law School to assist the kingdom in abolishing extra­
territoriality,, Toward the end of World War I, during which Thailand had 
sent her troops to France to fight with allied soldiers, Thailand again 
appealed for the revision of the previous treaties* The allies convened 
a council at Versailles for this purpose, but only the U.S. supported 
revision. Subsequently, in 1920, the U.S. kept her word and concluded 
a new treaty without asking for any compensation. This treaty was signed 
in Washington, D.C. on the 16th of December, 1920.^ Under the terms of 
this treaty the agreement of 1856 was nullified in its entirety.
In addition, the U.S. relinquished all ectraterritorial rights and
all American citizens were made subject to the jurisdiction of the
Thai Courts of Law. Regarding the limitations of the tariff, Thailand 
was given the right to impose any tariff on American goods providing the 
other treaty powers also agreed without compensation. Thus, the United 
States was the first country to have voluntarily surrendered the extra­
territorial rights of its citizens and the limitations upon tariffs.
The 1920 treaty was an important force that exerted influence upon other 
treaty powers and led them to give up their special rights.
By 1926, all the old treaties had been revised and the limitations
upon Thai jurisdiction abolished. The Thai leaders were aided in this 
endeavor by the services of Francis B. Sayre, son-in-law of President 
Woodrow Wilson and later American Commissioner in the Philippines. Thus, 
the good will and friendship between the two countries was solidified.
^U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Background 
Notes on Thailand. Pubn. No. 7961, June,1967, p. 4«
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Throughout this era, good will was created, many friendships were 
formed and the Thai began looking to the U.S. for moral support in 
their struggles with the British and French. In addition, many Americans 
voiced their admiration for the small country in Southeast Asia which had 
remained independent of colonial rule0
A fourth treaty between the two countries was signed at Bangkok 
on the 13th of November, 1937. This treaty, which was based on the full 
measure of equity, reciprocity and mutual benefit, is still in force to- 
day. When World War II began in December of 1941, a lull was initiated 
in Thai-U.S. relations. The Japanese invaded Thailand and quickly over­
came Thai resistance. From this time until the end of the war, Thailand
was occupied by,Japanese forces and was cqnsidered as such by the United_
States. Further, the Thai military leader, Phibun Songkhram, declared war 
against the U.S. and Great Britain in order to gain maximum autonomy for 
the Thai Government during the occupation period.
However, there was no actual deep-seated hostility toward the 
Western nations nor any real sympathy for Imperial Japan. Owing to this, 
the United States took a somewhat unconventional action and refused to 
recognize this declaration of war and supported a ’’Free Thai*' movement 
that infiltrated the country for military and intelligence purposes.^
Thai nationals in both the United States and Great Britain organized this 
movement as well as underground resistance which co-operated closely with
%oyal Thai Embassy, Office of Public Relations Attache, Thailand 
and Her Relations with the U.S., February, 1970, p. 3.
^James G. Driscoll, "American Policy in Thailand," National 
Observer (August 25, 1969), p. 16.
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the United States and other allies. However, at the end of World War II, 
Thai leaders had to make a formal agreement with Great Britain for the 
termination of the "State of War" between the two countries® In contrast, 
the United States made a forthright declaration that it did not regard 
itself at war with Thailand, and consequently, sphere was no need to 
conclude any treaty or. agreement to terminate the State of War between 
the two countries. Further, no compensation or reparation was demanded 
from the Thais0
Relations after World War II
After World War II, Thailand turned to the United States for sup­
port and friendship and received a spontaneous response. An agreement 
concerning economic and technical co-operation was signed by the two 
countries on the 19th of September, 1950, and since then economic and 
technical assistance has flowed from the U.S. to the Kingdom. When Com­
munist power was established on the mainland of China in 1949, a danger 
to Thailand in the form of threats of military aggression and clandestine 
subversion became apparent. Thus, on October 17, 1950, the United States 
and Thailand concluded the Military Assistance Agreement. According to 
this agreement, U.S. military aid has been rendered to help strengthen 
the Thai armed forces and Joint United States Military Assistance and 
Advisory Group was established to train Thai officers and soldiers.
With the close of ’World War II and the commencement of the Cold War 
in Southeast Asia, the United States replaced Great Britain as the 
major foreign influence in Thailand; and the policy of containment of 
Communist agression led the American Govei*nment to initiate a rapidly 
expanding role in the relations between the two countries. In brief, 
as the Cold War began, American interests were:
6
1. Geographical— Thailand composes a strategic area in the center 
of mainland Southeast Asia. After 1948, the surrounding 
countries became embroiled in bitter military conflicts either 
with their former colonial rulers or with Communist insurgencies.
To American policy-makers, Thailand appeared as an oasis of 
stability in a region of turmoil. Any reluctance by the U.S.
to cooperate with an authoritarian military regime was overcome by 
the need to protect Southeast Asia from falling under Communist 
rule.?
2. Peoole— The Thai people, about thirty-two million, comprise the 
largest population of any state on the mainland of Southeast 
Asia. Approximately 85% are peasants, however, they are capable 
of sophisticated tasks. Thus, they could be trained by their own 
leaders for the defense and advancement of their country, or 
they could be trained by a hostile power to carry out the 
overthrow of their own Government. Further, unlike other nations 
in the area, the Thai do not suffer from intense pluralism. Rather, 
the nation is relatively well unified, and a large majority of
the people are loyal to the King. Though minorities exist, 
they are a manageable and modest problem. The three million 
Chinese who control much of the private sector are satisfied with 
their economic status and play little role in international 
------- affairs .8 ------------------------- . —  ---------------- :------
3. Resources— 'Thailand is the world’s leading rice exporter and
annually produces a surplus of in excess of one million tons.
Further, a light industrial base has been developed and more 
manufactured goods are being produced locally. Over one
hundred American firms operate in the area and Thai resources are
. important to American policy because they assist in the economic 
development of non-Communist countries in Asia. Thus, the control 
of Thai resources by a hostile power could be used to the 
disadvantage of the United States and the non-Communist nations 
in Southeast Asia.9
American foreign policy toward Thailand since the beginning of the 
Cold War can be divided into three phases. The first encompasses the 
period from about 1950 to 1 9 6 1. During this era, the primary objective 
of the United States was to build the country into a ’’bastion" of the
?Frank C. Darling, "America and Thailand," Asian Survey. Vol. 7, 
No. 4 (April, 1967), pp. 215-216.
%bid.
9lbid.. p. 217.
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Free World and to prepare the country for an onslaught from Communist 
China. Despite the fact that overt aggression was unlikely, the United 
States rapidly expanded the Thai armed forces from 30,000 to 100,000 men.
Though the country had very few domestic Communists, the Americans strengthened 
the Thai police forces and urged suppressive measures against opponents 
of the Government. A strong U.S. Army mission helped train the Thai 
military and large quantities of American armament were provided. In 
addition, a modest chemical aid program begun in 1947 was converted to 
military objectives.-*-®
The internal repercussions of this policy were largely ignored 
by many American diplomats. With the large-scale military assistance
from the United States, the Thai military leaders were able to expand __  _
their control into every phase of national life and corruption within 
the military leadership greatly surpassed that of former civilian regimes. 
Further, the constitutional institutions inaugurated after the war were 
completely abolished and political parties and organized pressure groups 
were forbidden if not controlled by the ruling regime.H Throughout this 
phase, Thailand did make considerable economic progress; but much of the 
new prosperity went to a few favored groups such as the high-ranking 
military officers, land owners and privileged Chinese merchants.
Thousands of civil servants remained underpaid and millions of 
peasants received only a fraction of the price obtained from the sale of 
their rice. Som advances were made in education; but again, progress
l®Frank C. Darling, "Thailand: De-e.scalation and Uncertainty,"
Asian Survey, Vol. 9, No. 2 (February, 1969), p. 116.
n Ibid.
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was limited and, in many cases, reserved for the elite. Modem welfare 
services were restricted primarily to Bangkok and a few provincial centers, 
while secondary and primary schools outside the capital remained under­
staffed. To a certain degree, American policy during this first phase 
intensified the "split personality" which characterized the Thais at 
the end of the absolute monarchy. In diplomacy, finance, and trade where 
Americans and other foreigners dealt closely with the country, the Thais 
consistently exhibited a high level of intelligence and sophistication. 
Thus, the Kingdom's foreign policy realistically adjusted the national 
interest to the main forces of international politics. In addition, the 
country was secure, the currency sound and foreign trade expanding.
  However, in domestic affairs where Americans did_ not directly
participate, the Thai displayed immaturity and a low level of sophistica­
tion. Personal relationships continued to remain dominant in political 
life and little opportunity existed for the formation of political parties. 
The second phase of American policy in Thailand since World War II com­
menced in approximately 1 9 6l and encompasses the period from that year 
to 1968. During this period, the major function of Thailand for American 
strategy in Southeast Asia was to serve as a base in the military struggle 
to preserve the independence of South Vietnam. American planes used air­
fields in Thailand located only a few hundred miles from targets in North 
Vietnam. Further, numerous logistic and support facilities were con­
structed and Bangkok served as a rest-and-relaxaticn center for U.S. 
servicemen on leave from Vietnam.^
3-%red Greene, U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Company, 1968), p. 118.
9
The goals of U.S. policy during the first phase— to prepare 
Thailand for external aggression— overlap to scone degree with the ob­
jectives of the second phase. However, strategy in this phase rested 
on more realistic and rational grounds. South Vietnam was under intense 
Communist attack from both external and internal sources, and the U.S. and 
other non-Communist nations in the area felt they had a vital interest in 
preserving the independence and integrity of the former French colony. 
Thailand has played a crucial role in this endeavor and without the use 
of Thai bases, the U.S. military effort would be much more difficult and 
costly.
During this phase American policy in the military fields showed 
moderation. The militant anti-communism of the past was tempered and 
more emphasis was placed on economic and social development. With Amer­
ican assistance, the Thai Government gave more help to the provinces where 
units of modern technology have traditionally been quite sparse. Much of 
this program was concentrated on the strategic provinces of the Northeast. 
Improved roads now lead into formerly remote areas and for the first time 
in history universities have been constructed outside the capital cits'- of 
Bangkok. Further, more elementary and secondary schools were built and 
the country, generally, experienced increased prosperity.
However, the second phase is also characterized by the continual 
lingering of former political problems. Though the Government is more 
moderate than its predecessors, for few factions within the military leader­
ship are vying for power and attempts to move to some form of constitutional
^Darling, "America and Thailand," p. 219.
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government have been blocked by policies that emphasize order and 
security. In addition, the acute maldistribution of wealth continues to 
breed crime, and civil servants have not received pay raises since 1951.^
Post 196B Developments
Thus, the third phase of U.S. policy toward the Kingdom emerges.
This phase is post-1968 and is characterized by de-escalation and 
uncertainty. Winston Churchill once remarked that, "Sovereign nations 
possess no permanent friends and no permanent enemies; they only possess 
permanent interests."^ In 1968, certain aspects of this fundamental 
principle of international politics became painfully apparent to many 
members of the Thai Government. The de-escalation of American military 
power in the Vietnamese War and the possibility of a retrenchment of 
U.S. policy outside Southeast Asia aroused a growing sense of doubt 
and uncertainty among officials in the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
These develocments jolted them into a deeper realization that important 
sectors of their national life are closely related to the vagaries of 
international affairs.
Initial concern began when former President Johnson announced 
on March 31, 1968 that he was reducing the level of American military 
involvement in Vietnam and taking steps tovrard a negotiated peace set­
tlement with the Hanoi government. As the American presidential campaign 
progressed, Thai Foreign Affairs officials became increasingly worried
^Darling, "America and Thailand," p. 219.
^Darling, "Thailand: De-escalation and Uncertainty," p. 115.
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over numerous demands— from critics of both major political parties— for 
a disengagement of American power from Southeast Asia. In addition, public 
appeals for withdrawal from Vietnam and claims that the U.S. has only a 
"limited obligation" in Thailand had a chilling effect on many members 
of the Thai Government.
In brief, officials in Bangkok became increasingly fearful that 
, the U.S. policy which had been followed for several decades might be 
coming to an end. At mid-year 1968, Thai Foreign Minister Thanat 
Khoman declared, "The United States has tried to raise some doubts in 
our minds, and it has succeeded. It has succeeded in raising doubts in 
its own mind."^ This uncertainty heightened as external and internal
Communist threats continued to confront the Kingdom. On the. third an- ____ _
niversary of the Communist Underground Organization— the Thai Patriotic 
Front— Peking appealed for renewed efforts against American "Imperialism." 
Further, insurgencies within Thailand became more active in the Northeast 
and extreme South,^
Thus, in an official visit to Washington, D.C., in May, 1968,
Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachom sought assurances from the Johnson 
Administration that the United States would not abandon its obligations 
to defend Thailand following a settlement of the Vietnam War. Simultaneously, 
with Kittikachorn's visit to the United States, the Minister of National 
Development headed a 38-member trade mission to New York appealing for more 
private American investment in the Thai economy. Offering attractive
^J. L. S. Girling, "Thailand's New .Course," Pacific Affairs,
Vol. 42, No. 3 (Fall, 1969), p. 347.
17lbid., p. 348.
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trade and investment incentives, the Kingdom has promoted an expanded 
economic program with the hope that American efforts for peace and 
stability in the area will continue to stress economic development 
(through both public and private channels) following the end of the 
Vietnam conflict.
Toward the latter portion of 1968, this extreme uncertainty
appeared somewhat unjustified and U.S. policy makers seemed to maintain
a genuine interest in Thailand's security and prosperity. A joint
communique issued on July 9 reiterated America’s determination to uphold
its treaty commitments in Thailand. It stated:
The President re-emphasized the determination of the 
United States to stand by its treaty commitments to 
Thailand and its other allies in Asia. . . .  He noted
~~  “the pledge that he had given at the time of-his visit----
to Bangkok in 3.966 that the commitment of. the United 
States was not of a particular party or administration, 
but of the people of the United States, and that,
’America keeps its commitments.'19
However, in September, 1969, talks between the two countries re­
garding the departure of U.S. forces from the Kingdom grew directly out 
of Thai concern for the country's security after the end of the Vietnam 
War. Further, President Nixon’s announcement of the withdrawal of the 
first 25,000 men from Vietnam, and the President's emphasis on a future 
"low visibility" military posture in Southeast Asia disappointed Thai 
leaders who had welcomed Nixon's election as the implementation of a 
harder-line policy. In addition, on August 21, 1969, Secretary of Defense
^Darling, "Thailand: De-escalation and uncertainty," p. 116.
19Ibid., p. 117.
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Melvin Laird stated that the Nixon Administration did not feel bound by 
the 1965 contingency plan and a further withdrawal of 35, 0 0 0 troops from
/ v  20Vietnam was not communicated (beforehand) to Bangkok,,
Last, in July, 1969, following a speech in Bangkok, President 
Nixon met with Thai leaders regarding the levels of U.S. forces in 
Thailand. At that time there were approximately 48,000 personnel, mostly 
U.S. Air Force, in Thailand. Subsequently, following talks in New York, 
President Nixon and Prime Minister Kittikachom announced on September 30, 
1969, that the two governments had agreed that 6,000 U.S. military per­
sonnel would be withdrawn from Thailand by July 1 , 1970. This was
21carried out on schedule,, Further, it was announced that the two
governments would continue to evaluate the level of'U„S. forces in —
Thailand in light of developments in Vietnam. Following further
consultations, it was announced on September S, 1970, that an additional
229,800 U.S. personnel would be withdrawn by July 1, 197lo
In addition to withdrawal announcements, other aspects of Thai-U.S. 
relations have desplayed strains. Government spokesmen in Bangkok 
were incensed and the American Government embarrassed when a Senate 
foreign relations subcommittee disclosed that under a secret agreement 
signed in 1967, the U.S. had paid the Thai Government more than $200
^Girling, ’’Thailand’s New Course,” p. 348.
21U.S., Department ,of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Kingdom of 
Thailand, Pubn. No. 7961, November, 1970, p0 7o
22Ibid.
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million to send troops to Vietnam.2̂  Reportedly, to encourage the Thais 
to assign an elite 11,000 man division to Vietnam, the U.S. agreed to 
increase its military assistance and to supply the Thais with a battery 
of Hawk antiaircraft missiles. Foreign Minister Khoman decried, "The 
politicians of dubious morality who misrepresented this accord for the 
sharing of responsibilities as a decision by the United States to engage 
mercenaries. ',2̂
A second element of strain on relations also became evident in
1970. The policy of disengagement has resulted in extreme bitterness
in certain Government circles. Foreign Minister Khoman*s wrath was
again vented against "certain elements of American society who began to
use this country as their favorite practice target"25 in a speech to the
American Chamber of Commerce in July, 1970:
One may ask in bewilderment why those immature and 
irresponsible elements in the U.S. have shown per­
sistence in persecuting and molesting such a loyal 
friend and partner as Thailand. . . .In time of 
stress and strain the scum comes to the surface.
It was those unwholesome elements which poisoned 
the hearts and minds and adulterated the sound and 
solid traditions of a great people, . . .For having 
cooperated wholeheartedly with the United States,
Thailand had had to endure and suffer at the hands 
of those ugly Americans. . . . It seems inescapable 
that relations between Thailand and the United 
States will evolve toward a more selective basis.2°
Thus, in 1970 as the U.S. moved toward a "low profile" and eventual
2̂ Clark D. Neher, "Thailand: Toward Fundamental Change," Asian
Survey, Vol. 11, No. 2 (February, 1971)> p. 136.
^Ibid., p. 137.
25Ibid.
2 6Ibid.
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disengagement in Southeast Asia, Thailand began looking in new directions 
for a counterweight to the perceived Communist threat# Thai officials 
began stressing the need for an Asian front to include the major non- 
Communist nations of the region.2? in addition, Prime Minister 
Kittikachorn announced that all Thai troops in Vietnam would be withdrawn 
by 1972. Next, he agreed to meet with North Vietnamese officials to 
discuss the’repatriation of some 40,000 Vietnamese refugees living in 
Thailand. Finally, in 1970, Thailand, for the first time, signed trade 
agreements with Eastern European nations.2®
In essence, the Thai leadership has not been gleeful over President 
Nison’s moves to shift much of the burden of defending Southeast Asia 
to Asians. However, at least some in the ruling elite have long favored 
closer relations among the Southeast Asian nations. Thailand may be 
expected to strengthen ties with such countries as the Philippines, 
Indonesia, and possibly, develop a closer relationship with Peking. The 
key to the Prime Minister’s attitude toward China is almost certainly the 
realization that after 1963, the coincidence of interests between Thailand 
and the United States is receding; and, thus, the Thais can no longer 
rely on America's protecting presence. Thailand will certainly continue 
to utilize American military and economic assistance, but they are also 
seeking an alternative to the former policy of dependence by attempting 
to lessen the hostility of Communist powers and by initiating steps to 
build a non-Communist counterweight through regional cooperation. Possibly,
2?Neher, "Thailand: Toward Fundamental Change," p. 137.
2®Ibid.
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this could serve as a "power base" in the area, which American public 
opinion and the American Government would consider worth supporting.
The Nixon Doctrine 
This "low visibility" posture set forth by the United States appears 
to contain an implicit command directed toward the Southeast Asian 
nations. It seems to be telling them that they must assume a greater 
burden and obligation for their own defense. The "low posture" policy 
in Asia (also sometimes referred to as the "Nixon Doctrine") has been
enunciated on several occasions. In a lengthy statement at Bangkok,
Thailand on July 28, 1969, the President stated:
First, we remain involved in Asia. We are a
______ _____...... ..Pacific Power.. We have learned that peace for us
is much less likely if there is no peace in Asia.
Second, a growing sense of Asian identity and con­
crete action toward Asian cooperation are creating 
a new and healthy pattern of international relationships 
in the region. Our Asian friends, especially in 
Japan, are in a position to shoulder larger respon­
sibilities for the peaceful progress of the area.
Third, while we will maintain our interests in Asia 
and them commitments that flow from them, the chances 
taking place in that region enable us to chance the 
character of our involvement. The responsibilities 
once borne by the United States at such great cost 
can now be shared. Our important interests and 
those of our friends are still threatened by those 
nations which would exploit change and which pro­
claim hostility to the United States as one of the 
fundamental tenets of their policies. We do not 
 ̂ assume that these nations will always remain hostile,
and will work toward improved relationships wherever 
possible.
At the beginning of my trip through Asia last 
summer, I described at Guam the principles that 
underlie our cooperative approach to the defense of 
our common interests. In my speech on November 3,
I summarized the key elements of this approach.
-The United States will keep all its treaty commitments.
17
— We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens 
the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation 
whose survival we consider vital to our security and 
the security of the region as a whole0
— In cases involving other types of aggression we shall 
furnish military and e:conomic assistance when requested 
and as appropriate® But we shall look to the nation 
directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility 
of providing the manpower for its defense®
This approach requires our commitment to helping 
our partners develop their own strength® In doing so, 
we must strike a. careful balance® If we do too little to 
help them— and erode their belief in our commitments—  
they may lose the necessary will to conduct their own 
self-defense or become disheartened about prospects of 
development. Yet, if we do too much, and American forces 
do what local forces can and should be doing, we promote 
dependence rather than independence®
The partnership we seek involves not only defense®
Its ulitmate goal must be equally close cooperation over. 
a much broader range of concern— economic as well as 
political and military. For in that close cooperation 
with our Asian friends lies our mutual commitment to peace 
in Asia and the world. Cur goal must be particularly 
close cooperation for economic development® Here, too, 
our most effective contribution will be to support Asian 
initiatives in as Asian framework®
While I was in South Asia, I stated our view of the 
method and purpose of our economic assistance to Asia. 
These words were spoken in Pakistan, but they express 
our goals as well for India and all of Asia®
I wish to communicate my Government's conviction 
that Asian hands must shape the Asian future. This is 
true, for example, with respect to economic aid, for 
it must be related to the total pattern of a nation’s 
life® It must support the unique aspirations of each 
people. Its purpose is to encourage self-reliance, 
not dependence®
The fostering of self-reliance is the new purpose 
and direction of American involvement in Asia0
— While we have established general guidelines on 
American responses to Asian conflicts, in practice 
the specific circumstances of each case require care­
ful study® . . .  If we limit our own involvement
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in the interest of encouraging local self-reliance, 
and the threat turns out to have been more serious 
than we had judged, we will only have created still 
more dangerous choices. On the other hand, if we 
become unwisely involved, we risk stifling the local 
contribution which is the key to our long-run com­
mitment to Asia0
— The sucess of our Asia policy depends not only on 
the strength of our partnership with our Asian 
friends, but also on our relations with mainland 
China and the Soviet Union. We have no desire to 
impose our own prescriptions for relationships in 
Asia. We have described in the Nixon Doctrine our 
conception of our relations with Asian nations.
We hope that other great powers will act in a similar 
spirit and not seek hegemony0
— A sound relationship with Japan is crucial in our 
common effort to secure peace, security and a rising 
living standard in the Pacific area. We look for­
ward to extending the cooperative relationship we 
deepened in 1969. But we shall not ask Japan to assume
responsibilities inconsistent with the deeply felt -
concerns of its people.
— In South Asia, our good relations with India and 
Pakistan should not obscure the concrete dilemmas 
we will face. How can we bring home to both, for 
example, our serious concern over the waste of their 
limited resources in an arms race, yet recognize 
their legitimate interests in self-defense?
— Asian regionalism is at its beginning. We will 
confront subtle decisions as we seek to help main­
tain its momentum without supplanting Asian direc­
tion of the effort.
All these issues will confront this administration 
with varying intensity over the coming years. We are 
planning now to meet challenges and anticipate crises.
Our purpose in 1969 has been to make sure none was ig­
nored or underestimated. The task ahead— for Asians 
and Americans— is to address all these issues within 
the imagination, realism and boldness their solutions 
demand if lasting peace is to come to Asia.29
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, The United 
States Role in Asia. Pubn. No. P-444, February, 1970, pp. l-4o
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Subsequently, on February 18, 1970, in his report to Congress on
Foreign Affairs the President stated:
What we seek for Asia is a community of free nations 
able to go their ovm way and seek their own destiny 
with whatever cooperation we can provide— a community 
of independent Asian countries, each maintaining its 
own traditions and yet each developing through mutual 
cooperation,, In such an arrangement, we stand ready 
to play a responsible role in accordance with our 
commitments and basic interests.30
Thus, in these statements we can visualize at least some of the 
factors which the President was attempting to enunciate,, First, and 
foremost, the United States will no longer assume the primary defense 
role for countries of the area when confronted by insurgency-type con­
flicts but will look to the nation directly threatened to assume the 
manpower burden for its defense,. This has been quite evident in Vietnam
where troop withdrawals have averaged 12, 0 0 0 men a month since 1 9 6 9, and
31troop strength is supposed to be down to 184,000 by December, 1971o 
It was approximately 550,000 in 1968.3^ The "Vietnamization11 program 
somewhat symbolizes this factor0 Second, the Doctrine maintains that 
all treaty commitments will be kept and that a nuclear shield will be 
provided if certain nations in the area are threatened by a nuclear power0 
Third, the Doctrine implies increased cooperation in the economic sphere 
as well as defense* But again, the President emphasized that the most
30■ U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, The United 
States Role in Asia. Pubn. No. P-444, February, 1970, pp. 1-4.
3^HNixon on Vietnam: More of the Same,11 Newsweek. Vol. 77, No. 16
(April 19, 1971), p. 26.
3 2Ibid.
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important contribution will be for the United States to support Asian 
initiatives in an Asian framework* Last, the President spoke of Asian 
regionalism and sustaining its momentum* Ultimately the Doctrine appears 
to be telling the Asian nations that they must assume the primary role in 
the battle for security, economic growth and defense*
Perhaps a more concise picture can be gained of this "low posture"
33from the President’s article^written in Foreign Affairs* Referring to 
the future of Asia, Nixon states that it will be "one in which U.S. leader­
ship is exercised with restraint, with respect for our partners and with 
a sophisticated discretion that ensures a geuninely Asian idiom and Asian 
origin for whatever new Asian institutions are developed*"34 He further 
'"•stated:  ! - ------ ■-- ------- --— — ---------------------- ■--------
In a design for Asia’s future, there is no room for heavy-
handed American pressures; there is need for subtle encour­
agement of the kind of Asian initiatives that help bring 
the design to reality* The distinction may seem superficial, 
but in fact it is central both to the kind of Asia we want 
and to the effectiveness of the means of achieving it*
The central pattern of the future in U.S.-Asian relations 
must be American support for Asian initiatives*35
In essence, a shifting of the burden is what seems to be transpiring,
and further, a declining direct American presence* This has been
evidenced not only in Thailand and Vietnam but also in South Korea
(20,000), Okinawa (5,000), and Japan (12,000)* Further, Okinawa will
36revert to the Japanese in 1972, and troops have been removed from Taiwan*
^Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam," Foreign Affairs. Vol. 46,
No. 1 (October, 1967), p« 124*
% b i d *
3 5Ibid.
36U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 
1970’s. Vol. 64, No. 1656, March 22, 1971, p. 347*
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Obviously, it should not be assumed that the United States is 
withdrawing completely. Actually, some will argue that the U0S. is 
seimply implementing a modified presence and will no longer play the 
"Marshall Dillon" role. This viewpoint contains some credence as 
several years ago money was proposed for modernization of the U.S. Navy 
when Vietnam subsides. Supposedly, one of the functions of this modernized 
Navy will be to maintain a quick-reacting type task force throughout 
Asian waters as well as in other parts of the world. Thus, one might 
argue that Marshall Dillon will now "walk on water" rather than insert­
ing his feet in a swampy jungle quagmire. Secretary of Defense Melvin 
Laird was more explicit (than previously) on April 13, 1971, regarding 
~the future American military presence in Southeast Asia. He states that, . 
"The United States will keep air and naval power in Southeast Asia, under
the long-range Nixon Doctrine, after American ground troops are with- 
37dravn." He continued, "To state that we would not have a presence in 
Asia tinder this realistic deterrent strategy . • « would be very mislead­
ing."38
Thus, it is obvious that an indirect presence is likely in the 
military sphere. In addition, in the economic sphere the U0S. will con­
tinue to supply economic aid, but it will be in support of Asian initiatives 
and will not smell of hegemony. In brief, Southeast Asians must assume 
the main responsibility for their economic growth and defense security, 
and U.S. policy appears to be pointing toward this objective. Thailand
"U.S. to Continue Presence in Asia," The Missoulian, April 14,
1971, P. 1.
3%bid.
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has, for several decades, assumed special significance for the United 
States for several reasons. First, diplomatic relations have existed 
between the two countries for a longer period of time than between the 
U.S. and any other Asian nation. Second, Thailand is a stable and fairly 
self-subsistent nation in an area where these factors are somewhat rare0 
Third, the kingdom has never been colonized and has a fairly high degree 
of unity. Fourth, Thailand occupies a somewhat strategic geographical 
location on mainland Southeast Asia and has been exhibiting economic 
growth at a respectable rate. The U.S. commitment to Thailand was 
epitomized by Dean Rusk in 1962 when he made a statement concerning 
SEATO. He stated, "In the event of Communist armed attack against 
Thailand, the SEATO obligation of the United States to act to meet the 
common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes is 
individual as well as collective."^ To some people in both countries 
this meant that the U.S. would '’stand alone" to defend Thailand.
However, there seems little doubt that the Thai's special and 
somewhat privileged position is coming to an end. Further, if the over­
powering American presence is receding in Thailand, then it seems evident 
that all of the Southeast Asian leaders can look forward to a somewhat 
congruent policy toward their nations. Obviously, the "low posture" and 
declining presence have been apparent in Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, 
and other nations. Thus, one begins to speculate on what may fill this 
power vacuum evolving from the declining American presence. It appears 
that two forces are evolving to shape the Asian future of the late 1970's
■^u.S., Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Kingdom 
of Thailand, Pubn. No. 7961, November, 1970.
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and 1980'So These two forces are regionalism and quadrilateralism0 
Though Southeast Asias Regional Groupings have had little potential 
in the past, there appears to be reason for at least cautious optimism 
for them in the future0 This force will be discussed in the following 
chapter. The second emerging force— that of quadrilateralism will be 
viewed in Chapter III0
/
CHAPTER II 
REGIONALISM
Feasibility of Regionalism 
Regional economic and security arrangements appear to be appropriate 
for Southeast Asia for several reasons. First, the major security 
arrangements in the region during the next decades -will most likely be 
for counterinsurgency-type forces and the likeliest areas to be threatened 
are in Southeast Asia. Second, in the aftermath of the Vietnam quagmire, 
the United States is seeking to reduce the need for commitment of its own
combat forces in the area. Third, Southeast Asian perceptions of the _
need to meet insurgent threats have been heightened by Britain’s with­
drawal from Singapore and the Thai insurgency. Fourth, the formation of 
ASEAN in 1967-— Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and 
Singapore'®'— brought together the most important countries of Southeast 
Asia into a group dedicated to regional cooperation. The fact that five 
nations formed this group seems to reflect a convition that development 
goals of Southeast Asian states make it necessary for them to pool their 
resources. This convergence may suggest that if outside powers provide 
relevant assistance, the next decades may witness the development of 
successftil economic and defense cooperation in and among the countries 
of Southeast Asia. In the regard, Richard Butwell states: "If there is
^Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)— A multipurpose, 
indigenous and politically neutral organization.
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a regional body in being that could evolve into a successor to SSATO 
as a regional peace-keeping instrument, it is probably ASEAN.
Further, in his celebrated article in Foreign Affairs, Richard 
Nixon discusses the transformation of Asia and states: "One key to this
transformation is Asian regionalism, Since 1965* it has become evident 
that the United States has again begun to encourage multilateralism in 
Southeast Asia, This recent multilateralism looks beyond military al­
liances toward groupings of Asian states based on wider and more enduring 
convergencies of interest. This shift was first noted in April of 1965 
when former President Johnson, in a speech at Johns Hopkins University, 
announced a $1 billion program to encourage regional development in
..Southeast Asia<A _________   __________________ .  _____ _
Encouragement of regionalism has been initiated by the United 
States for two reasons. First, the expectation exists that regional 
cooperation, especially among the smaller countries, can aid in speeding 
the processes of economic development. For example, the U.S. is pressing 
for the establishment of a common market in Latin America. However, 
few would argue that a common market approach is appropriate for Asia 
at present. Thus, the United States is encouraging other forms of
ilichard But well, "The Philipoines Under Marcos," Current History. 
Vol. 58, No. 344 (April, 1970), p. 201.
^Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 4 6, 
No. 1 (October, 1967), p. 111.
4Bernard K. Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Southeast Asia 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Company, 1969), p . 104.
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economic regionalism. A prime example is the establishment of the Asian 
Development Bank. In addition, a variety of other cooperative ventures 
are being encouraged. Among these is a series of Southeast Asian 
Ministerial Conferences on higher education and transportation.
These are essentially economic aspects of regionalism. The 
other aspect, which has become increasingly apparent, is based more 
clearly on political considerations. This part of American interest 
stems from the belief that if regional cohesion develops in Asia, es­
pecially if it includes Japan, it will help establish an added power 
center. Resultingly, in the short run with the added development and 
stability that regional cooperation may bring, Asian states will be 
less susceptible to subversion and be better able to defend themselves.
In the long run, the U.S. hope appears to be that Asian regionalism 
will lead to a multibloc system in the area in the 1970s and SOs. This 
would be somewhat similar to a balance-of-power system and what the 
United States seeks in the area seems to be a structure which is multi­
centered and not tightly bi-polar. Finally, this multi-polared structure 
would (allegedly) lessen the probability of war.
This restructuring of the Asian system appears to be no accident, 
or mere by-product of American actions. Instead it appears to have 
been a conscious goal of most U.S. officials including the President 
himself. To say that the U.S. hopes to help reshape the Asian system—  
by virtue of a more cohesive Southeast Asia— is really saying that 
American objectives are changing. No doubt, the U.S. interest in the 
area will remain the same— to prevent any one nation dominance in the 
region— but there is no desire to press that interest to the point of 
conflict *nith China. The desire to avoid such a collision with China
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explains the American concern today to develop conditions that can 
lead to a multipolar Asia.  ̂ On October 17, 1966, at the East-West 
Center in Honolulu, former President Johnson stated: "No single nation
can or should be permitted to dominate the Pacific region."^ He also 
alluded to regional cooperation ■when he stated: "One after another,
the nations of Asia are casting off the spent slogans of earlier narrow 
nationalism. . . . One after another, they are grasping the realities 
of an interdependent Asia."? The President cited the Asian Development 
Bank, Asian and Pacific Council and other undertakings as evidence of the 
new cooperation.
Further, in a speech at Middlebury College on June 12, 1967,
Walt W. Rostow, Johnson's assistant for national security affairs, 
stated: "We are finding in regionalism, a new relationship to the
world community somewhere between the overwhelming responsibility we 
assumed in the early post-war years— as we moved in to fill vacuums 
of power . . . and a return to nationalism."® In brief, the degree 
of political significance for the U.S. lies in the ability of South­
east Asian regionalism to make a constructive contribution toward a 
multipolar Asia. A Southeast Asia that remains divided will not only 
fail to contribute to multipolarity, it will continue to perpetuate 
the tight bipolarity which is considered dangerous. Thus, to the
^Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Southeast Asia, p. 67.
^Seville R. Davis, "Containment in Asia," Christian Science 
Monitor, October 19, 1966, p. 14.
7Ibid.
^Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Southeast Asia, p. 69.
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extent that Southeast Asian states are weak and aim to embark in diverse 
and separate directions in search of security and development, two 
outcomes might appear and tend to maintain the present bipolarity.
One outcome might represent the successful achievement of Communist 
China's goals as Fred Greene has concluded that China's desire is 
"for predominance in the eastern half of Asia."9 If this objective were 
achieved the likely result might lead the U.S. into policies even more 
hostile and suspicious of China than is the case at present. In addition, 
it is possible that this may be the impact upon Japan as well, and 
certainly the effect would not be a loosening of the present bipolarity. 
The second outcome of a continued weakness and division in Southeast
—   Asia might represent, the opposite. pole: _ the continued need by Southeast__
Asia to rely on the United States.
This result would be somewhat of a continuance of the present 
situation in Asia; for example, the Thai and Philippine Alliances with 
the U.S. and the tendency of Indonesia to look to Washington for as­
sistance. This outcome can only be expected to heighten Chinese sus­
picions and aggravate many tendencies that could lead her to initiate 
aggressive behavior in Asia. In essence, it seems apparent that region­
alism is a vehicle which the U.S. intends to utilize to serve her 
national interest in Asia. This national interest— to prevent a direct 
confrontation with China— will thus, be supported by an Asian 
structure characterized by a loosening of bipolarity and the subsequent 
emergence of multipolarity. The U.S. has chosen to de-escalate the 
confrontation with China, and further, is modifying its approach to
^Fred Greene, U.S. Policy and the Securit.y of Asia, p. 195*
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prevent one nation from dominating. Though U.S. actions have spurred 
Asian regionalism there are a number of reasons why there has been a 
renewal of interest in regionalism within the a r e a . l ®  No longer are 
Asian leaders simply paying !,lip service" to U.S. proposals but are . 
taking positive action, for several reasons.
First, there is incentive emanating from China. For the past few 
decades scholars have debated and feuded in some cases regarding the 
precise goals of China in Asia. This writer is of the opinion that 
China’s intentions are fairly clear. China intends to achieve great- 
power status, and in the tradition of great powers, she expects to be 
regarded as dominant in the region of the world in which she lives. 
Several analysts concur in this opinion.H
In the immediate future it appears for geographical reasons that 
any Chinese expansion must be in the direction of Southeast Asia. The 
Soviet Union is a powerful presence to China’s North and West* Similarly, 
on her eastern flank a dynamic and somewhat prosperous Japan makes it 
pointless to attempt major influence at present. In contrast, Southeast 
Asia represents a power vacuum and in contrast to other areas, is much 
more ideal for the application of Mao’s revolutionary doctrines. Further, 
as a region still characterized by a poverty-ridden population, Southeast
■^Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Southeast Asia, p. 75.
^A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia(New York; Random 
House, Inc., I960), p. 65; Richard G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign 
Policy(New York: Frederick Praeger Company, 1962), p. 37; Fred Greene,
U.S. Policy and the Security of Asia, p. 195; Harold Hinton, Communist 
China in World Politics! Boston; Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p.' '394•
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Asia holds the promise of greater gains with less risk and effort than is 
involved in other areas adjacent to China. Finally, it is.in Southeast 
Asia where the power'and policies of the United States— China's 
proclaimed major enemy— are seen as provocative and need to be countered 
and neutralized.
Yet some authors— David Mozingol^ and others— still argue that 
Mao's foreign policies are simply defensive-response reactions to U.S. 
actions and that China will live at peace with any Southeast Asian state 
which is disassociated from the United States. This writer feels that 
this interpretation is not only optimistic but naive for several reasons. 
First, in 196? Peking repeatedly called for the overthrow of the 
"Rahman puppet clique" in Malaysia, a government that was not tied 
to the U.S.^ Further, in 1965, there was Chinese involvement in an 
attempt to stage a coup in Indonesia— a country which had intimately 
close ties with Peking at the tirne.^ Even in Cambodia in 1968, Prince 
Sihanouk suspected Chinese support for groups opposed to him.^ This 
came despite the fact that earlier he had referred to China as Cambodia's 
best friend. In a formal statement he also added that "insurgents in 
Laos and Thailand act on the orders of North Vietnamaid China.
•^David Kozingo, "Containment in Asia Reconsidered," World Politics, 
Vol. 19, Mo. 3 (April, 1967), pp. 361-377.
•^Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, p. 7 6.
V. van der Kroef, "Gestapu in Indonesia," Orbis, Vol. 10,
No. 2 (Summer, 1966), p. 467.
■^Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, p. 77.
l6Ibid.
31
Burma provides another interesting example* After mid-year 1967/
Rangoon found that General We Win was branded a traitor by Peking*.
Subsequently, Peking has frequently called for, '’all the Burmese people to
rise up to strive for the complete overthrow of the Ne Win military
government and the establishment of a People's Democratic and United Front 
17Government." f In late 1968, there were reports of a mysterious new
18Chinese assisted "Northeast Command," and it seemed that China was 
laying the base for some type of united fronto Thus, this stem posture 
toward Burma is somewhat unexplainable, especially since Ne Win had 
gone out of his way to placate Peking. If Peking is simply reacting 
to the U.S. then she is "reacting" to threats that few others find 
perceivable. These brief examples illustrate that Peking may hot necessarily 
seek friendly relations with neutral nations of Southeast Asia*,
A much more plausible explanation is that Peking seeks friendly 
relations with governments in Asia who are subject to major Chinese 
influence. All in all, those idio continue to maintain that China is 
simply reacting to U.S. presence are, in my opinion, simply failing 
to recognize the realities of the situation and are engaging in super­
ficial analysis. Rather, is seems that China is behaving more in line 
with the traditional behavior patterns of great powers. Further, those 
who deny the need for countervailing power around China reflect an 
extremely naive view of the way Chinese power is likely to be usedo An 
Australian scholar has stated:
17Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, p. 77*
18"Burma: The Insurgency, "Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol0 44 
(October 17, 1968), p. 10.
32
To argue in 1966 that China could never be expected 
to acquiesce in a rival power structure in Southeast 
Asia is precisely equivalent to arguing in 1946-47 
that Russia could never be expected to tolerate a 
rival power structure in Western Europe, Such a 
situation was possible and Russia did in fact come 
to accept it, and twenty years later after the process 
began . o « the prospects for peace look a good deal 
better than when it was initiated. To assume that 
China must be conceded unchecked hegemony in South 
Asia is to acquiensce in so substantial an addition 
to her future power-base (taking into account man­
power, resources and nuclear weapons) that it is 
difficult to see the consequent world finding a way 
to live quietly or to keep its crises manageable0 
There is of course no present similarity between the 
situation of South Asia and that of Western Europe, 
That is why the intervention of the outside powers 
over a long transition period /perhaps twenty years) 
is likely to remain necessary.
In broad terms this is a view held by leaders in Thailand,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam, Even Prince Sihanouk
stated in 1967 that, ”China does not swallow Cambodia because of the 
20Americans,” In essence, this is the primary reason for a revived 
interest in regionalism in the Southeast Asian nations; fear of Chinese 
domination, Fran the Asian standpoint, China is the traditional great 
power of the region, with a long history of exercising considerable 
influence. Considering the fact that China is composed of one of the 
great and cohesive world cultures, it is not surprising that her presence 
has long impressed the people of Southeast Asia, However, though several 
Asian nations have been deeply influenced and shaped by Chinese culture 
(Japan and Vietnam, for example) China has not become endeared to the
19Coral Bell, "Towards a Stable Asia,” The World Today, Vol. 22, 
(April, 1966), p. 190.
20nThe Sihanouk Trail,” Christian Science Monitor, October 16, 
1967, p. 13.
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people on her borders. She is still the giant of the region and looked 
upon with a good amount of suspicion.
A second factor which has caused Asian leaders to turn to re­
gionalism concerns the anxieties -which the small states feel toward the 
nanyang or ’’overseas" Chinese. Throughout the area the Chinese exercise 
economic dominance that is in some cases resented, feared and distrusted,. 
The movement of the Chinese to Southeast Asia is relatively recent; it 
was accelerated greatly by the economic and administrative policies of 
colonial regimes of the past centuries. Despite their somewhat recent 
arrival, the Chinese have been the dominant ethnic group in economic 
matters in Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand and in some respects in Indonesia
■-and the • Philippines..^- —  - ----- :--------------- - -- -------------
It is quite true that in some countries the Chinese have been 
smoothly assimulated and in some have not occupied the role as in other 
regimes, but this qualification does not detract from the fact that a 
basic racism exists and is aimed at local Chinese,, This is one of South­
east Asia’s distinguishing characteristics and in the years since 
independence, there have been many instances of abuse and intimidation,.
In brief, tvro China's exist in the minds of many Southeast Asians: China 
the great and fearsome nation, and China the source of the dominated alien 
group at home0 Neither is a positive factor. It is in this perspective 
that the concept of regional cooperation has been revived,,
China's unfriendliness has provided the factor which the en­
vironment for regional cooperation has lacked: a common perception of 
threat. Since this was lacking, the concept of regionalism had no great
21Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, pp. 8l-820
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urgency. However, there seems little doubt that China cannot be regarded 
as a passive element in Asia's affairs and could become a troublesome 
participant if nations of the area lack unity. The third factor which 
has caused nations of the area to turn to regionalism is a more positive 
one and concerns economic potential. It should be mentioned that, at 
present, few Southeast Asian leaders think of regional cooperation as 
a major input to defense needs. Most recognize that defense requirements 
cannot be met with local resources and that an American presence must 
provide an indispensable security framework.
Rather, leaders in the area seem to see in regional cooperation 
a means of achieving some type of solidarity and unity. Thai Foreign 
.Minister Thanat Khoman is an exception to this and has viewed regional 
cooperation as more oriented toward political and security affairs. In 
1968, he states: "The motivations are not only economic; the motivations
p pare political."^ For many leaders, however, it has been more comfortable 
to speak only in economic terms and this has been the primary publicly 
expressed justification to date.
Some Asian economists stress that many of the developmental 
needs of Southeast Asia— technical know-how, improved agricultural 
productivity, and capital availability— can be met through greater 
intra-Asian cooperation. One of these, Professor Hiroshi Kitamura of the 
United Nations has long Urged that Southeast Asian countries can reap 
considerable benefits through regional harmony in their industrial develop­
ment p r o g r a m s .^  Initially, some areas of industrialization (steel, aluminum)
p p  ,^"Thailand: Economic Expansion," Far Eastern Economic Review,
Vol. 44 (October 17, 1968), p. 156.
23Bernard K. Gordon, The Dimension of Conflict in Southeast Asia 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966), pp. 141-166.
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require considerable capital and one of the smaller states acting alone, 
may not be able to manage the outlay. In addition, world money markets 
are likely to be attracted to opportunities which reflect a regional 
plan. The Governor of the Bank of Thailand has also expressed the 
opinion that money markets are more likely to be attracted if two or 
more countries do not duplicate facilities.2*̂-
Asian specialists have maintained their pro arguments for several 
years and in 1965 and 1966, the United States and Japan began to recon­
sider their negative assessments. The Japanese reversed their position 
in 1965 and the United States followed in 1966 with each committing 
$200 million to the Asian Development Bank.25 Thus, a final factor 
which has hastened interest in,Asian.regionalism is that leading out- 
siders are in support of the concept. Thus, if there are any positive 
aspects of the Vietnam War, one might be that it has given the countries 
of the area the time to begin restructuring their regional politics. As 
early as 1966, Thanat Khoman stated that, 11 The long-range hope is to 
build an effective Pacific community— to forge one that will be a 
successful deterrent to aggression."^0
An Australian writer has stated: "The U.S. stand in Vietnam has
both stimulated interest in and opened up the prospect of much closer 
relationships between the free Asian states. Instead of fretting about 
how to live with communism, the Southeast Asians have now become concerned
^"Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, p. 85.
25ibid., p. 87.
^"Thai Leaders in New York," Washington Post, October 30, 1966, 
p. 29.
about finding a way to live with each other, conscious as never before 
that by hanging together they will avoid the danger of being hanged 
separately."^ In essence, there are three primary reasons why there 
has been a renewed and more constructive interest in regionalism in 
Southeast Asia. First, there is a fear of China, the monolith of the 
North and of the alien locals ’who have wielded considerable economic 
power in the countries of Southeast Asia. Second, there is at least a 
chance of economic gain through more economic cooperation and interde­
pendence. Finally, with the blessings and support of the U.S. and Japan 
the countries are much more confident when taking steps in this direction,,
Earlier Attempts at Regionalism 
To date there have been several attempts at regional cooperation;” 
and before discussing ASEAN in detail, it seems appropriate to discuss 
earlier attempts that culminated in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations). The Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) had its origins in the 
year of 1959 when the Prime Minister of Malaysia and President Garcia of 
the Philippines conferred in Manilla. Soon thereafter the Malaysian 
leader Abdul Rahman began to circulate proposals for a Southeast Asia 
Regional Organization. This proposal came to the attention of Thai 
Foreign Minister Khoman and in 1961 it was agreed that Malaysia, Thailand 
and the Philippines would proceed with the establishment of ASA. It was 
formally created in a meeting at Bangkok, Thailand, in July of 1961.
The initial goals of the organization were somewhat idealistic. They
^Denis Warner, "First Steps Toward an Asian Common Market," The 
Reporter, Vol. 35, (May 18, 1967), p. 24.
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included talk of a free trade area, a three-nation airline and a shipping 
service and even a'common market. Secondary goals included educational 
exchanges, joint training.of agriculture technicians and joint programs 
of industrial development.28
It "was soon evident that most interest centered on projects in the 
economic field. In early 1963, a number of meetings had taken place and 
broad outlines were discernible. The structure had developed on three 
separate levels.. The first, and the one which had given ASA its birth, was 
an annual foreign minister’s meeting. The second level was comprised of 
a group known as the Joint Working Party. This body represented senior 
officials in various ministries of the three governments and generally 
.made recommendations regarding final,agreements of ASA. The .third level 
was the working committees who conducted detailed discussions and examin­
ations of proposed cooperative pr o j e c t s . 9̂ Examples of these committees 
included those concerned with shipping, trade liberalization, fisheries, 
and agriculture.
In mid- 1963, as this structure was evolving, the organization 
ceased operation due to conflicting claims to Borneo between Malaysia
. trand the Philippines. Unfortunately, the organisation had just completed 
its first year and v/as just beginning to outline some creative steps.
One of these was the "ASA Fund.”̂  This fund v/as an initial three million 
dollar subscription from each government and was to be used for financing
* 'Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia, Chs. V, VI.
29Ibid.
-^Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, p. 101.
of joint reses-rch projects. This was a somewhat unprecedented develop­
ment and suggested that the three governments were beginning to look upon 
the small subregional group with genuine, though limited, expectations of 
accomplishment. In a sense ASA operations went to the deep freeze from 
1963 to 1966 but re-emerged in 1966.
This recovery was the first indication that regional cooperation 
in Southeast Asia had a certain amount of dynamism. In retrospect, though 
ASA achieved few tangible results, it might be looked upon as a success 
for several reasons. First, it represented an unprecedented and indigenous 
Asian effort and second, it set the programs and procedures for future 
steps. In addition, it increased communications and understanding among 
its members and further, its most practical contribution was probably the 
mere fact that it survived. Owing to this a strong appeal to Southeast 
Asia's elites was begun and eventually led to Indonesia's participation 
in ASEAN in 1967. Thus, with the birth of ASEAN in 1967 the two major 
drawbacks of ASA— too small a membership, and a too Western-oriented group—  
were removed.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is actually 
the result of a merger between ASA and Maphilindo.^l Maphilindo was 
created in 1963 and though a loose consultive oriented body of the three 
Malay nations (Malaysia, Philippines, and Indonesia) it was given 
considerable attention for two reasons. First, Indonesia was a participatin 
nation and previously had avoided regional cooperation proposals.
Second, it was realized that Indonesia was a fairly productive nation in 
Southeast Asia and that her participation in regional cooperation was
31̂Gordon, Toward Pisengagement in Asia, p. 111.
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highly desirable.
Initially, Indonesia's distaste for entering into the ASEAN scheme 
was explained by distaste for aligning thamselves with a western leaning 
organization and further since they consider themselves the natural leader 
of the region they did not want to humble themselves by asking for membership. 
Thus, in August of 1966, Thai Foreign Minister Khoman visited Djakarta and 
discussed regional cooperation with Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam 
Malik.Subsequently, in December a document was circulated from 3angkok 
to the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore.and Malaysia which was a careful 
and conscious merging of the purposes of ASA with much of the style of 
Maphilindo.
This was the SEARC-proposal ( Southeast Asian Association for Re­
gional Cooperation). Ultimately, through the efforts of Khoman and Adam 
Malik differences concerning refinement of this proposal were resolved.
During this formation period, Thai and Indonesian leaders both gave a 
remarkable amount of time to the task of creating the multination 
organization. Malik, during April and May of 1967, made a series of trips 
throughout Southeast Asia with two purposes in mind. The first was to 
inform the neutral states of Burma and Cambodia of Indonesia's plans for a 
new regional group and second, to negotiate with other leaders regarding 
the launching of the new group,^3
3 2 " T h a i - I n d o n e s i a  confer," New York Times, August 30, 1966, p. 5* 
^Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, p. 118.
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The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
Meanwhile Khoman attempted to persuade Malaysian leaders to accept 
Indonesia’s new course, When finally successful, Khoman's reputation as 
a negotiator was greatly enhanced and represented somewhat of a triumph 
for him as he had long recognized that bipolarity is not only dangerous 
but especially -uncomfortable for the smaller states of Asia,34 Thus, ASEAN 
was formed at Bangkok on August 8, 1967. Subsequently, writing in Foreign 
Affairs, Adam Malik gave the organization strong endorsement and emphasized 
its neutral nature,35
The significance of ASEAN is that it is the first general, indigenous 
and politically neutral effort in Southeast Asian regional cooperation.
Its characteristic as a general or multipurpose organization means that 
ASEAN must be distinguished from groups devoted to specific functions 
such as.Mekong Development Committee and Southeast Asian Ministerial 
Conferences on Education (SEAMES). Most of these are narrowly based. The 
indigenous nature of ASEAN should also be stressed as this is a most 
important characteristic and was lacking in other efforts at regional 
cooperation. The ministerial conferences on education, SEATO and the 
Colombo Plan have been based primarily on suoport and initiative of states 
outside Asia. ASEAN reflects high priority local interests stemming from 
the consideration that the organization is entirely the work of Southeast 
Asian governments.
34Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, p. 119.
35A.dam Malik, "Promise in Indonesia," Foreign Affairs, Volc 46,
No. 2 (January, 1968), p. 302.
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Finally, much of the potential significance of A3SAN derives from
Indonesia*s participation, which helps remove the stigma of a Western
orientation, ASEAN participation represents somewhat of a departure in
the nature of Indonesia's foreign policy and opens the possibility for
Indonesian collaboration with states that have had successful development
experience— Thailand and Malaysia, Within a few months after the
Declaration, the five Governments agreed to designate Indonesia as the
36host of the organization's standing committee. Soon after representa­
tives began meeting in Djakarta and in February of 1968, they had identi­
fied a series of projects which were to be initiated. For example, 
efforts will concentrate on food production and supply, in which ASEAN 
jls expected to facilitate data exchanges and loans of specialists.
Further, it will be the function of the organization to pursue combined 
ASEAN trade missions outside the region and meetings of business organi­
zations to achieve trade liberalization measures.
In addition, exchanges of personnel and data in such fields as 
transport and telecommunications and publishing. Moreover, a number of 
steps were taken to exchange defense information and in 1968 some leaders 
offered suggestions for defense cooperation,-'' These steps represent at 
least a mild change in the Asian political environment which has been and 
still is tom by severe ethnic differences and narrow nationalistic 
policies. In many cases, the explanation of the change is the recognition
Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, p. 121,
^11 cooperation in Asia," Washington Post, January 14* 1968, p. 22,
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that the task of economic development can be aided by collaboration with 
neighbors. To date, several noteworthy steps have been taken which
38illustrate that there is quiet progress. T.T.B. Koh lists severalo 
Though no dramatic breakthroughs have been ma.de the Association has 
identified specific areas of cooperation including (l) food production 
and supply; (2) communications, air traffic service and meteorology;
(3) civil air transportation; and (4) shipping,,
Further, a mild breakthrough has been make in the field of tourism,,
-f
The five governments have agreed to promote VISIT ASEAN YEAH 1971 through 
joint publicity abroad, in order to attract tourists to the ASEAN region 
as opposed to individual countries. Under consideration is a proposal for
 ---- —  the pooling of passenger rights between the airlines of the memberstates<>-. -
Under this scheme, only carriers of JsSEAN countries could pick up pas- 
sengers between points within the region. The ASEAN fund is another 
example of the countries * intentions to cooperate for mutual benefit.
Under this fund, each nation has contributed one million dollars to 
finance joint projects approved by the ASEAN ministerial meetings.,
In recent meetings, the ministers gave approval to more than 
ninety recommendations concerning regional practices.^9 Many of these 
include agreements between two or three nations. For example, Malaysia, 
Thailand, and Indonesia have established a buffer stock arrangement in
3 % “. T. B. Koh, "International Collaboration Concerning Southeast 
Asia," The Annals, Vol. 390 (July, 1970), p. 21.
•^Koh, The Armais, p. 22; Also see: "ASEAN: Inching Forward,"
Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 71 (April 3> 1971), pp. 15-16.
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the tin mining industry and Singapore has formed a Joint airline with 
Malaysia* Singapore has also taken steps to reduce taxes for industrialists 
forming partnerships, in Indonesia with Indonesian entrepreneurs. Finally , 
in 1970, though Cambodia is not a member, the Cambodians in 1970 signed
an agreement with Singapore to cooperate in the fields of timber and' Id
fisheries.
Koh also discusses another aspect of ASEAN which warrants attention.
This is the relationship betvreen the organization and the United Nations.
At the twenty-fifth session of the Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East (ECAFE) heldih April, 1969, a proposal was made that ECAFE con­
duct an economic study of the five ASEAN nations and help identify areas
--where closer cooperation might be feasible. This link has significance   ----
for two reasons. First, it enables ASEAN to receive the benefits of the 
UN. Second, since ECAFE is somewhat impartial, recommendations made 
will be given serious consideration by all member nations.
Another effort in the field of regional cooperation which involves 
the five ASEAN countries is the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education 
Council (SEAMSC) which m s  formed in 1965 by the five ASEAN countries 
in addition to Laos and South Vietnam.^® To date, SEAMEC has given birth 
to a Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture, a 
Regional Center for Tropical Biology, a Regional Center for Tropical 
Medicine and Public Health, a Regional Center for Education in Science, 
a Regional English Language Center and a Regional Center for Technology.
Thus, success in these endeavors may provide a source of confidence for
^®Koh, The Annals, p. 22; "ASEAN: Inching Forward," pp. 15-l60
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the pursuit of other regional undertakings*
Within the economic sphere, the Southeast Asian nations appear 
to have taken at least the first few steps toward economic cooperation*
If achievements in economic cooperation are reflected in accelerated 
rates of growth, then it would seem reasonable to expect a continuation 
of political support for regionalism* Further, improvements in economic 
conditions should help in reducing the appeals on which insurgents have 
operated for many decades* Yet,it seems absurd to assume that subversive 
efforts in the area wall quickly subside. Thus, interest in defense 
cooperation may be forthcoming* As previously mentioned, this aspect of 
regionalism has been discussed, and though substantial efforts have not 
been made in this direction, the probability of its emergence seem possible*
Defense Cooperation 
Though ASSAM was largely espoused to be organized around the 
traditional "safe area" of economic cooperation, the desirability of 
expanding its activities into the military area was openly expressed 
before the ink v/as dry on the Declaration*^ All the nations of the 
association have indicated an interest in regional defense cooperation
and even President Marcos of the Philippines suggested in 1963 that
"an interim security arrangement be made within the framework of ASEAN. "42
B e r n e r  Levi, "The Future of Southeast Asia," Asian Survey, Vol. 10, 
No* 4 (April, 1970), p. 350.
^Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia, p« 1220
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The five nations are searching for -ways to provide for their own security 
and, while it would be misleading to state that regional defense will 
become a reality in the near future, it is significant that the countries 
are thinking in these terms and beginning to overlook the extreme nation­
alistic tendencies of the paste
The present ASEAM group now represents a sizable portion of the 
population, lend mass, and resources that comprise Southeast Asia# If 
this group eventually represents an interconnected regional defense 
system, it could take a major stride toward assuming the burden of its 
own security# Against the background of China and the forces which give 
reality to regionalism, it is evident that for a multipolar Asia to evolve 
there must be a structure in which the United States is not the only 
counterweight to China# This counterweight may take the form of an 
ASEAN defense force and, though its development may lag behind economic 
cooperation, it may be appropriate for several reasons,,
Initially, it seems to this writer, that SEATG is an inappropriate 
model for the future# Essentially, SSATO is a unilateral American guarantee 
with merely the coloring of or a tinge of multilateralism# In addition, 
the leaders of Southeast Asia seek to disassociate themselves from a heavy 
dependence on the United States or any other great power# Finally, with 
the advent of the Nixon'Doctrine, a declining U.S. posture and the stated 
objective of allowing Asian countries to share more of the burden of de­
fending themselves, 3EAT0 appears inappropriate. Concerning the future of 
SEATO, Eichard li7TTi5con has written:
SSATO was useful and appropriate to its time, but 
it was Western in origin and drew its strength from 
the United States and Europe. It has weakened to
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the point at which it is little more than an insti­
tutional embodiment of an American commitment, and a 
'somewhat anachronistic relic of the days when France 
and Britain were active members. Asia today needs 
its own security undertakings, reflecting the new 
realities of Asian independence and Asian needs.^
A second reason why defense cooperation appears appropriate con­
cerns the development patterns of Asian regionalism. Asian leaders of 
today realize that defense cooperation is an extremely difficult under­
taking and that considerable common experience and trust is required 
before this form of cooperation can be attempted. Thai Minister Khoman 
has cemented this point when he said; "Joint economic projects will 
provide the ASEAN nations with something they want to join together to 
defend."^
A final aspect of the appropriateness of defense cooperation 
concerns the nature of the threats in the area. It seems reasonable to 
predict that security threats in the area will be primarily concerned 
with defense against low-level operations or insurgent threats. This 
should be a task which the countries of ASEAN are capable of combating 
and defeating. Obviously, the countries of the association cannot meet 
the full range of defense functions. The ultimate security against, for 
example, nuclear blackmail or large-scale aggression can only be provided 
by a great power.
Perhaps,, if these countries are expected to shoulder more of the 
defense burden, they should be assured that the U.S. will maintain the
^Richard M. Nixon, .."Asia After Vietnam," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 4 6, 
No. 1 (October, 1967), p. 115.
^Gordon, Tov/ard Disengagement in Asia, p. 130.
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strategic umbrella, at least for the immediate future. Though the ASEAN 
Declaration stresses the participating nations• stability and security 
from external powers and further maintains that all foreign bases are 
temporary, this does not seem to preclude the U.S. from temporarily 
backstooping the organization. In brief, assuming the future defense 
needs are primarily for counter-insurgent type operations, then it seems 
appropriate that capabilities of a joint ASEAN force be used for combating 
these lower level threats.
In retrospect, there are three reasons why a joint ASEAN 
counterinsurgency force appears feasible. First, the shortcomings 
of SEATO for the future. Second, when economic growth develops the
countries involved will have an investment worthciefending and finally,__
owing to the likely nature of future threats, nations in the area should 
be able to combat them. If this cooperation does, in fact, become 
reality, there are several implications for the United States.
First, concerning the ASEAN member nations, it would appear that 
this group includes those nations which can reasonably be regarded as 
having at least some of the characteristics of stability insofar as the 
region as a whole is concerned. Resultingly, the U.S. would appear to have 
an interest in insuring the security of the five states. Further, 
though formal commitments to Thailand and the Philippines may still exist, 
there is a strongly held belief within'the U.S. that commitments in 
Southeast Asia should not be enlarged. Thus, if there is an increasing 
interest in regional, defense cooperation, then it would appear that the
United States can hardly fail to benefit. Third, a policy of continued 
American disengagement may help to-galvanize Asians into accelerating
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their plans for self-reliance— much as Britain’s announced withdrawal 
from Malaysia led Malaysia to consider regional defense cooperation.
Last, obviously a policy of disengagement cannot be pursued 
without restraint. However, if a policy of disengagement is followed, 
it may lead to a relaxation of China’s attitude toward United States 
"containment.” To cite an example, both Thailand ana the U.S. will 
benefit if China finds less reason to believe that the Bangkok govern­
ment is an American puppet. Yet, only some reduction in Thailand’s 
heavy dependence on the United States is likely to produce such a change 
in Chinese thinking. An ASEAN defense force might be a major step toward 
convincing the Thais that it is feasible to reduce dependence on American 
guarantees and, thus, convince China that Thailand is not a provocative 
neighbor— possibly reducing the threat from Peking.
From the aforementioned implications, it appears that three 
primary guidelines emerge for a United States foreign policy toward 
Southeast Asian nations. First, groupings of certain states represent 
a development generally favorable to American interests and should 
probably be encouraged. Second, regional security cooperation should 
not be seized upon as a justification for premature withdrawals. We 
must insure that .ASEAN and other defense capabilities are not overestimated. 
Finally, the United States must encourage the interest and cooperation 
of the one nation of the area that possesses enormous capacity for sup­
porting ASEAN and the nations of Southeast Asia— Japan.
CHAPTER III
JAPAN, SOVIET UNION, AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF QUADRILATERAL BALANCE
Japan
The role which Japan decides to play in Southeast Asia may be
one of the most important factors in the future of the area. In a press
conference on April 7, 1954# President Eisenhower stated:
In its economic aspects, loss of Indochina would take 
away that region that Japan must have as a trading 
area, or it would force Japan to run toward the 
communist areas in order to live. The consequences 
of the loss of Japan to the free world'are just 
incalculable.
Carl Oglesby— writing in his essay on Containment and Change— refers to 
Japan as "an extremely critical element," and he sets forth the following 
propositions.* First, Japan's economic strength is the crucial element 
in America's policy of containing China and maintaining peace in Asia. 
Japan is the bastion. Second, with the exception of Canada, Japan is 
our leading trading partner and is of major commercial Importance. Third, 
if China and Japan develop economic interdependency, then the brute 
mathematics of the relationship may doom Japan to juniority— much as 
Britain would be junior to an economically integrated European continent.
^William A. Williams, The Shaping of American Diplomacy (Chicagoj 
Rand McNally Company, 1956), p. 1119.
2Carl Oglesby, Containment and Change (Toronto: Macmillan Company, 
1967), p. 123.
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If Japan has no long-term alternative to massive Chinese trade, 
she will be left without an alternative to a progressively more pro-Chinese 
orientation. Last, Japan’s only chance for a long-term alternative to 
the developing market of China lies with the more slowly-developing and 
less organizable markets of the South Pacific, and Southeast Asia.
Southeast Asia’s now buried treasures mean that her markets, once 
developed, will exert a great pull on Japan— the trader— regardless 
of who develops them. Thus, Oglesbjr concludes: what Japan and the
U.S. face in the Pacific is the formation of a regional economic system 
which must include Japan, would quite likely be dominated by China, 
and whose potential and power in the Pacific would be considerable.^
Recently (April, 1971) the Japanese Ambassador to the United
States delivered a lecture at the Naval "war College and stated:
Two-way trade between Japan and the United States has 
grown rapidly since the 1950s and is approaching 
310 billion this year. This is the largest volume 
of overseas trade between any two nations in the 
world. Only United States-Canadian trade is larger.^
In addition, about 30 per cent of Japan's international trade is with 
the United States, and this fact caused one journalist to remark, "Japan 
cannot afford an American growth rate as low as 3/̂ . Outside the United 
States, the region of greatest importance to the Japanese economy is South­
east Asia which accounted for about 29 per cent of Japan's trade in 1968.^
^Oglesby, Containment and Change, p. 129.
%obuhiko Ushiba, "Japan: Her. Role in'-World Affairs," Naval War
College Review, Vol. 23, No. 8 (April, 1971), p. 18.
%ax Hays, "Why Japan's Growth is Different," Fortune (November,
1967), p. 246.
^James M. Elster, "The United States-Japan Alliance," Naval far 
College Review, Vol. 22, No. 5 (January, 1970), p. 26.
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To maintain this pattern the Japanese have advocated a.multi­
lateral . system of development-which stresses accumulation of capital, 
development of technology and improvement of management ability. Thus, 
given Japanese dependence on Southeast Asian markets, the significance 
of the U.S. commitment to Vietnam in 1964 ^ 6  196$ was not so much the 
decision to fight communism but the decision to underwrite the develop­
ment of the entire region. The U.S. exported nearly $4-billion to Japan 
in 1969,^ an amount nearly equal to that exported to Britain and France 
combined.
Presently, the Japanese economy is outstripping almost every 
other in the world (with-the possible exception of the United States).
It is growing at an annual rate of 10 per cent, ranks number three in the 
world in total GNP (Gross National Product) and leading Japanese economists 
are now considering proposals to double the GNP in the next twenty 
years.® (In addition, Japan enjoys secure sea lanes owing to the 
presence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.) According to former U.S. Ambassador 
to Japan, Edwin 0. Reischauer, "Almost half the energy sources on which 
Japan lives— the oil of the Middle East— passes through the straits of 
M a l a c c a . The sea lanes are an extremely vital factor in the security 
of the island nation. In addition to oil, numerous other materials move 
in and out of Japan by sea. These include iron ore, cotton, lumber, wool,
^Alexis Johnson, "Jaoan and Future American Relations," The Annals, 
Vol. 390 (July, 1970), p. 6 5.
®Ushiba, "Japan: Her Role in World Affairs," p. 19.
9j?dwin 0. Reischauer, Beyond Vietnam (New York: Alfred A. Knopf
Company, 1968), p. 133,
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and foodstuffs.
Finally, in 1970, the Japanese Foreign Office released figures 
which indicate that the island nation now enjoys a substantially higher 
per capita income than do the 200 million people of the Soviet Union. 
This only're-emphasizes the fact that Japan has reached the point where 
she can now make new and more extensive contributions to stability and 
progress in Asia. It seems obvious that Japan has, in fact, been given 
a ’’free ride" in the Southeast Asian situation. However, with the im­
plementation of the "low posture” policy, she may no longer be able to 
maintain her lack of military presence.
The Vietnam experience has certainly convinced many Americans 
that there is something fundamentally wrong with a strategy which re­
quires the United States to assume the military burden while Japan 
channels its energy into the relatively secure business of developmental 
assistance and proceeds to trade with all the combatants, simultaneously, 
in a particular conflict. If the somewhat close alliance betvreen the 
U.S. and the island nation is to continue, then a much more equitable 
balance will have to be cemented in the respective roles. This very 
factor caused former Secretary of Defense KacNamara to remark:
If, for example, other nations really believe, 
as they say they do, that it is in the common interest 
to deter the expansion of Red China's economic and 
political control beyond its nations! boundaries, then 
they must take a more active role in guarding the 
defense perimeter*H
Johnson, "Japan and Future American Relations," p« 65o
^Robert S. MacKamara, The Essence of Security (Hew York: Harper 
and Row Company, 1963), p. 156c
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There can be little doubt that Japan possesses the capacity for a 
much enlarged role in Southeast Asia in both the economic and defense 
spheres. However, it is also apparent that gaining the island nation’s 
economic sooperation will be much easier than obtaining a larger 
participation in defense and security. Japan, is already substantially 
involved in Asia and has important interests in the development of 
Southeast Asia. Foreign Minister Aichi has stated as one of Japan’s 
objectives: "To create a Southeast Asia free from war, wre have to join
hands with each other for the cause of development and stability. It is
f
in this spirit that Japan will be a partner in joint efforts of the South­
east Asian countries to advance toward a bright future."12
  This was- a call for- economic cooperation leading, to a peaceful__
future, and it cannot be overemphasized that Japan has a tremendous 
economic stake in Southeast Asia, Even in 1967, Japan had 23 per cent 
of Southeast Asian trade, completely overshadowing Communist China, 
replacing former European nations, and surpassing the U . S . 13 Further, 
Japan is the first or second leading trade partner with every nation in 
the area with the exception of Cambodia where it is third,^4
More significant is the fact that in recent years, Japan has enlarged 
its role in regional affairs and has become active in several regional 
programs. For example, in 1966 the;/ participated in the conference on
^james Buck, "Japan’s Defense Options," Asian Survey, Vol. 10,
No. 10 (October, 1970), p. 896.
l^Donald C. Heilman, "The Emergence of an East Asian Subsystem," 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 4 (December, 1969), p. 429.
•^Ibid.
Asian Agricultural Development, joined in multilateral aid to Indonesia 
(1967), joined the Asian and Pacific Council in 1966, and pledged 
$200 million to the Asian Development Bank while providing that organ­
ization’s first president. The Asian and Pacific Council was formed at 
Seoul in June of 1966 with nine members— South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Nationalist China, South Vietnam and 
Japan.
The initial goal of ASPAC was purely economic cooperation through
a regional bank to handle development of rice and an international
technician pool.^ This may have been the price of Japanese participation
as the organization has voiced little support for defense undertakings.
..—  does not seem too unrealistic to assume- that Japan will,-no doubt,---
play an increasingly constructive role in Asian economic cooperation.
Moreover, Japan seems to look upon her economic power as the primary way
she can combat the security threat in Asia. Writing- in Naval War College
Review, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States wrote in 1971:
The security threat in Asia seems to be not so much 
a danger of large-scale aggression by one country 
against another as it is the type of clandestine sup­
port that one country might give to a group in a second 
country for ideological reasons. Such support would be 
based upon social and political unrest in the second 
country. The unrest which invites this type of aggression 
is largely caused by the kind of poverty which now exists 
throughout much of Asia. And the poverty problem in 
Asia, home to over one-half of the total world population,
, is staggering. In this context, Japan’s duty is clear.
She must use her new- economic strength to help bring 
about the stability and strength in the Far Bast that is
■^"Japan’s Economy GroT.\dng,n New York Times, June 16, 1966, p0 21.
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necessary to the enduring peace of that region,^
In essence, Japan is already somewhat active in the economic sphere
within Southeast Asia, However, the sphere of defense cooperation is
quite another matter. At present, the 261,000 man ’’self-defense" force
cannot be legally deployed outside Japan and recent surveys indicate that
an overwhelming number of Japanese feel that no military arms should go to
Southeast Asia,17 This survey also caused Mendel to conclude:
The pacifist organization and nuclear allergy of the 
vast majority of the Japanese public, including the 
younger generation often assumed to have forgotten the 
lessons of World War II and the Pacifist Occupation 
Reforms, is clearly evident in all of the data presented 
above. No 'one should fear or expect Japan to assume 
a military containment role in the 1970’s.-^
It is worthy of mention, however, that some new trends in Japanese 
defense policy have been noted recently. Briefly, Japan vri.ll no longer 
depend completely on the Japanese-United States Security Treaty of i960 
but will assume more of the burden for her own defense. This fits in 
with the Nixon Doctrine, whereby nations assume prime responsibility for 
their ovm defense but obviously this cannot be interpreted to mean that 
they will play a greater role in the defense of other Asian nations. The 
new program will primarily strengthen the naval defense force and seems
to reflect an increasing consciousness of Japan’s dependence on the sea
19•lanes. In addition, the promised return of Okinawa in 1972 is reflected
■^Ushiba, "Japan: Her Role in World Afairs," p. 17o
17Douglas H. Mendel, "Japanese Defense in the 1970's: The Public 
View," Asian Survey, Vol, 10, No. 12 (December, 1970), p. 1056.
l8Ibid., p. 1068.
19Kobun Ito, "JaDan’s Security in the 1970’s," Asian Survey, Vol. 10, 
No. 12 (December, 1970), p. 1033.
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in the new policy of added self-reliance. These facts have caused some 
"Japan watchers" to argue that the dominant thrust of Japanese policy 
today is not toward the sharing of containment burdens in Southeast Asia 
but rather toward a military disengagement from the United States,^®
In addition to the naval building program, The Economist of 
October 28, 1967 (pp. 434-36) indicates that during 1968 and 1969 Japan 
was scheduled to produce 60 fighter aircraft, 45 reconnaissance types,
45 large helicopters and 55 small copters. Further, literally thousands 
of trucks and small arms were scheduled for production. Moreover, by 1972, 
Japan will possess three battalions each of Hawk and Hercules missiles and 
plans were being made for the production of the U.S.-designed F-4 Phantom 
fighters. Last, with China producing.nuclear weapons, this possibility 
is no longer anathema as it was during the 1950's, Japan is rapidly de­
veloping nuclear power for peaceful purposes and according to one 
evaluation is now producing enough plutonium to produce "one atom bomb 
a month o"^-
When queried about acquisition and production of nuclear weapons,
the Japanese Ambassador to the United States has given a flat "Mo"
answer and cited several reasons, including, the overwhelming negative
feeling of the Japanese people, the prohibition by the Constitution, fear
22of neighboring countries and numerous others. Though some new trends
^OElster, "The United States-Japan Alliance," p, 35o
21Charlotte Saikowski, "Japan Tom by Nuclear Dilemma," Christian 
Science Monitor, April 27, 1968, p. 13,
2%shiba, "Japan: Her Role in World Affairs," p, 1034o
57
are surfacing in the Japanese defense posture, they are not of the mag­
nitude to be referred to as a significant change. As Ito has remarked,
"It is vdser for Japan to promote good will through cultural and economic 
cooperation with countries along Japan's sea routes and to meet security 
requirements by political rather than military m e a s u r e s , 11̂
The Japanese Foreign Minister commenting on a simple transfer 
of Southeast Asian peace-keeping responsibilities from the U.S. to Japan 
has further stated: "Japanese public opinion is simply not prepared for 
such an undertaking; nor I believe, would the other free nations welcome 
it. For some time to come there will be no substitute for the continuing 
presence of American deterrent power."24
It seems apparent that it is highly unlikely that Japan would ever 
rise up completely from her low-military posture and undertake a large 
program of rearmament with nuclear weapons and missile capability. How­
ever, the enormous increases in Japanese economic power and Japan's in­
creasing involvement in the economies of Southeast Asia- would seem to 
indicate a growing concern and interest for the stability and security 
of that region.
Thus, Japan shares the interest of seeing Southeast Asia remain 
stable and at the same time is not willing to play any facsimile of an 
activist role in the defense of this interest. There is a certain ambiva­
lence and this may be the attraction that the concept of a joint ASIAN-type
^Ito, "Japan's Security in the 1970's," p, 1034®
^Kiichi Aichi, "Japan's Legacy and Destiny of Change," Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 4-3, No. 2 (October, 1969), p« 31.
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security force may present to Japanese leaders. The reasons for this lie 
in the fact that Japan could make an important contribution to the security 
of Asia, t're counterbalance of China, and the defeat of insurgencies 
without becoming directly and unilaterally involved. If aid were channeled 
through the United Nations, it would also be vatbin the scope of the 
Japanese; Constitution.
Support for a regional counterinsurgency force, such as might evolve 
from organization similar to ASSAM, could eventually represent an acceptable 
mid-range step for Japan. Obviously, technical training assistance and 
v small arms supply to a force of this type would appear to be much less 
provocative to China than a Japanese decision to unilaterally rearm. In
 addition, it would provide a convenient rationale for Japan to maintain   r
her arms industry and with U.S. sanction may be more palatable than uni­
lateral efforts. Japan could contribute small arms, economic assistance, 
and perhaps, technical advisors rather than making massive troop commit­
ments.
Lucian Pye has remarked, '’Even limited cooperation among a few
of the Southeast Asian states can provide the necessary formula for
bringing Japan effictively into the process of supporting the Asian 
balance of power. However, one is forced to conclude that major 
Japanese defense participation in Southeast Asia is unlikely during the 
next decade. Support of an ASEAN-type counterinsurgency force is within 
the realm of possibility, but Japan looks upon her role as primarily
25Lucian W. Pye, "China in Context," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 45,
No. 2 (January, 1967), p. 235*
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economic. The words of a former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and one of the 
leading scholars on the island nation seem, to have merit: "do not expect
Japan to play more than an economic role in Asia during the next d e c a d e ."^6 
The emergence of Japan accounts for the third of the four great 
power nations that are presently becoming active in Southeast Asia. The 
fourth nation is the Soviet Union.
Soviet Union
The Soviet Union has become considerably more active in Southeast 
Asia since the American military disengagement has begun. At an interna­
tional meeting in Moscow on June 5, 1969, Leonid Brezhev first spoke of
27"collective security for Southeast Asia." This was generally inter­
preted to mean economic security and according to Gurtov was simply a 
signal to the nation of the area that the Soviets maintained an interest. 
Most important, however, the move was designed to undermine the influence 
of mainland China0
In brief, the Soviet Union has been attempting to prevent the 
area from becoming a Chinese sphere of influence, and Gurtov- and others
are of the opinion that statements of Soviet leaders are evidence of 
28this. China has been considerably irked by Soviet contracts with Taiwan 
and contacts with Japan concerning timber harvests in Siberia, docking :
26sdwin 0. Reischauer, "The Future of Japan," Asian Survey, Vol. 9, 
No. 8 (August, 1969), p. 639.
^Melvin Gurtov, "Sino-Soviet Relations and Southeast Asia," Pacific 
Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Vinter, 1971), P- 500.
28nThe Soviet Union in Asia," Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 71 
(March 20, 1971), p. 20.
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rights and access to sea lanes. Further, negotiations have begun between 
the Soviets and Thailand concerning commercial aviation and trade agree­
ments. Finally, the Soviets have approached India concerning basing 
privileges and have executed an agreement with Singapore concerning ex­
panded port facilities for Soviet ships,,
These facts have served to enhance the Chinese-Soviet split and have
caused stiffer competition between them. Regarding these facts, John
Badgley remarks, "Sino-Soviet relations are deeply disturbed and will not
be resolved, both because of the territorial and prestige factors and
29because of the competition for worldleadership." 7 Toward the end of 
the 1960*s, China had acquired an independent nuclear capacity of a sort 
—and-•was pursuing her self-reliant policies; border clashes even posed the 
danger of war between the two major communist powers. Further, China 
underwent a traumatic internal upheaval in 1965-1966— The Cultural 
Revolution.
To some degree, the "Cultural Revolution" reoriented China’s outlook 
inward resulting in diplomatic isolation. Perhaps, the Chinese are 
preoccupied with the dual problem of rebuilding China's political system 
at home as well as by the threat of conflict with the Soviets. During 
1 9 6 9, the Soviet-Chinses conflict reached its maximum danger point.
For several years, China had resorted to demonstration on the Chinese-
^John H. Badgley, "The American Presence in Asia." The Annals.
Vol. 390 (July, 1970), p. 41.
3%arold C. Hinton, "Conflict on the Ussuri," Problems of Communism, 
Vol. 20 (April, 1971), p. 66.
6l
31Soviet border and had expressed defiance of "Soviet Revisionism."
As the locus of the 1969 demonstration, the Chinese chose the disputed is­
land of Chenpao, in the Ussuri River, which had been the scene of similar 
demonstrations in the past.
Subsequently, according to the Soviet version of the incident 
(which has gained acceptance, according to Hinton), Chinese troops set 
an ambush for an outnumbered Soviet patrol in the early hours of March 2. 
In the ensuing firefight, the Soviets incurred heavy casualties,. Sub­
sequently, on March 15, the Soviets ambushed a Chinese patrol and in a 
larger battle obtained a clearcut victory. These clashes caused Senator 
Edward Kennedy to remark:
  __    The deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations in the ____
wake of the recent border clashes may be stimulating 
at least some of the leaders in Peking to re-evaluate 
their posture toward the U.S. and provide us with an 
extraordinary opportunity to break the bonds of dis­
trust.
Minor clashes have continued to occur at scattered frontier points 
and China has become increasingly concerned with security of nuclear 
weapons installations in Sinkiang province. However, since the major 
incidents of 1969, both have attempted to avoid major frontier incidents. 
The Chinese continue to display uncompromising political and ideological 
hostility toward Moscow and the increased relations between-the. Soviets" 
and U.S. probably have Peking worried. The Salt Talks, Soviet Treaty with
3libid., p. 47.
^A. Doak Barnett, The U.S. and China: The Next Decade (New York: 
Praeger Company, 1970), p. 155.
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West Germany, the absence of an American-Soviet confrontation over 
Cambodia are all sources of concern to Peking.
At present, the split is much less volatile than in 1969* A
navigation agreement has been reached, a new Chinese Ambassador has been
sent to Moscow and various negotiations are continuing. Further, name
calling has declined, and according to Hinton, "The cult of Mao has
33clearly declined." In any event, there seems little doubt that the 
Soviet presence in Southeast Asia is looked upon as a threat to Peking 
and to some degree may account for the initiation of overtures toward 
the U.S. in 1971— the advent of "ping-pong diplomacy."
A veteran Asian expert, Sydney Liu, has remarked, "despite the 
olive branch that Leonid Brezhnev extended to Peking at the Soviet Party 
Congress in April, 1971, Moscow and Peking remain bitter foes and both 
have continued to reinforce their garrisons along the 4,000 mile border 
between them,Recently, the Soviets have begun to expand diplomatic, 
economic, and military influence in the area that China has traditionally 
considered to be its own backyard. One Western diplomat remarked: "The
Russians aren't coming to Southeast Asia, they have already arrived."35
Today, it is common to see Soviet seamen, diplomats, officials, 
and airline crews in many of the countries of Southeast Asia. Singapore 
and Malaysia have already established full diplomatic relations with
33ninton, "Conflict on the Ussuri," p. 66.
^Sydney Liu, "Russia in Southeast Asia," Newsweek, Vol. 77,
No. 15 (April 12, 1971), p. 49.
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Moscow, and the Philippines is expected to do so in the near future. The
reason for the acceptance of the Soviet presence seems to be the fundamental
change in attitudes of the leaders of the countries of the area. Singapore's
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew declared: "The'-Soviet Naval capacity in the
Indian Ocean and the South China Sea can be a counterpoise to China's
36weight . . .  on the littoral countries of Asia and Southeast Asia."
Another diplomat from Singapore remarked, "Frankly, the only way for us 
and most of the other nations in Southeast Asia to preserve our 
independence is to have a balance of the big powers in the area."-̂ 7
Individual countries tend to view the Soviet presence from different 
perspectives. For example, Laos and Cambodia can point to their Russian 
embassies as pr'oof of their neutrality in international affairs while the
 -Thais see: the Soviet presence as an alternative to Japan's hold on
Thai economy and have signed a trade agreement with Moscow. In Malaysia, 
the Soviet Embassy staff has grown considerably since relations began 
in 1968. The two countries are now conducting negotiations concerning 
aid for reorganization of the Malaysian Navy.
Further, the Soviets have been very careful and cautious in order 
to avoid their old revolutionary image. They try hard to show that 
they are unlike the savage, unreasonable Chinese Maoists and are 
instead, "good Communists." In addition, they have not hesitated to 
criticize insurgent groups that have a Peking orientation. For example,
36iiu, "Russia in Southeast Asia," p. 49. 
37Ibid.
in Cambodia, a Soviet diplomat referred to an insurgent group as, "a
few hungry peasants”; and in Thailand, a Soviet official commented, "the
Guerrillas are merely a bunch of jungle bandits.Last, in Ceylon, it
vras reported on April 22, 1971, that Russian advisors and equipment were
being given to the Ceylon government to combat an insurgency initiated
39by the so-called, "Che Guevarists.”̂ 7
In brief, there is now a fourth major power operating in 
Southeast Asia and attempting to fill any vacuum remaining from the 
declining American presence. It might be argued that the Soviets will 
never have the strength to match the U.S'. economic and military presence. 
However, the Soviets seem to be making a move in this direction, and it 
seems reasonable to assume that their presence will be increased during 
the 1970s. The opinion that the U.S. must fight to keep the Soviets 
out of Southeast Asia at all costs has been expounded by some American 
diplomats in the area,^® and seems to be testimony to the fact that 
McCarthyism is alive and well and living in American diplomatic circles 
of Southeast Asia. Koivever, one American diplomat had a much more 
enlightened opinion concerning the Soviet presence. He stated: "I
think the time has come when we are going to have to live with the 
Soviets in all areas of the world, including this one."^
3%,iu, "Russia in Southeast Asia,” p. 50.
-^"Ceylon, All the Way with Che?” Far Eastern Economic Review,
Vol. 71 (April 3, 1971), p. 8.
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Thus, now emerging simultaneously with regionalism is a quadri­
lateral relationship between the United States, China, Japan and the 
Soviet Union. This new relationship in the area among the great powers 
is the result of three basic factors. The split between the Soviet 
Union and the Communist Chinese. The re-emergence of Japan as the number 
three economic power in the world, and finally, the movement of the U.S. 
toward a decreasing military involvement and a ''low post Tore" in the future
Emergence of Quadrilateral Balance 
In a sense, therefore, the pattern of great power relations in 
Southeast Asia in the 1970s will likely be a quadrilateral one, and 
appears that it will be fundamentally different from the pattern
-rexisting in the recent past.- There-are several reasons- for-thisj- ------
First, each of the four .powers can be expected to pursue its interests 
with independence. Virtually everything each power does will have 
important implications and repercussions for the other three. For 
example, the Soviets may try to expand relations with Japan and other 
nations, thus competing against both the Chinese and Americcan. influence.
At times, however, some Soviet policies may parallel those of 
the United States and, thus, China may fear Soviet-American collusion. 
Peking, in order to strengthen its position against Moscow, may well 
decide to initiate more flexible policies toward the U.S. or even Japan; 
subsequently, Moscow may be apprehensive about Chinese-American coopera­
tion that could become anti-Soviet. Japan provides another example.
While pursuing more independent policies she will have an interest in 
improved relations with both Peking and Moscow but may find that improved
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relations with-one can have an adverse effect on relations with the 
other. Further, if Tokyo goes too far in expanding relations with 
either, it may cause considerable uneasiness in Washington. Finally, 
the United States will probably want to preserve its alliance with 
Japan and maintain a balance in U.S.-Soviet relations but will likely 
continue to push— to Moscow's chagrin— for a lessening of tension with 
Peking.
Though these factors may appear to be destabilizing elements, 
there will very likely be limits on the extent to which any of the 
four cowers will be able to manipulate the balance to its advantage. 
There are two reasons why the situation may be stabilizing rather than 
destabilizing. First, it does not seem likely that there will be major 
relalignments among any of the four powers that could upset the balance.. 
If, for example, Chinese-Soviet relations improve, it seems unlikely 
that the alliance could be restored to the status of the early 1950s.
If Chinese-American relations improve, significant barriers still exist 
to deter close relations— the Taiwan question, ideological differences, 
and so forth.
If Japan expands its relations with one of the Communist powers, 
a break with the United States would be improbable as Japan's economic 
interests are closely linked with ours. If the Soviets and Americans 
sometimes.adopt parallel positions against the Chinese, the basic 
divergencies of interest would likely prevent complete collaboration. 
From the United States standpoint, the possibility of lessening.tensions 
with China will likely have appeal, both to provide a counterweight to 
the Soviets and to alleviate the confrontation with China.
Second, the balance may help to reduce the. likelihood of large-
power military conflicts for several reasons. None of the four powers, 
in considering military involvements, will be able to ignore the possible 
reactions of all the other powers. For example, Peking's apprehension 
about a hostile Soviet Union at its back will impose new limits on its 
policies elsewhere, and Moscow's uncertainty about American and Japanese 
(as well as Chinese.) reactions to action it might take should operate 
to reinforce other constraints against such action.
Further, all four of the major powers, each with its own interests 
and views, will be involved in situations throughout the region; and 
instead of bipolar confrontations, more and .more situations will involve 
complicated patterns-of competition, cooperation, and parallel actions.
...It seems likely that as a ..result of these factors, the quadrilateral.__
balance may create a complex pattern of mutual constraints that could 
operate to inhibit and limit large-power intervention in local military 
conflicts and may encourage the pursuit of goals through diplomatic and 
economic maneuvering and competition.
Hopefully, the complexities created by this balance may reduce the 
dangers of local conflicts which could invite big-power intervention in 
some of the sensitive areas of tension. Taiwan is a good example.
Peking has not been reckless in its approach to Taiwan recently. However, 
in the 1950s when it felt it was backed by the alliance with the 
Soviets, the Chinese -were quite willing to initiate military probes to 
see if the U.S. could be dislodged. The inhibitions to these probes 
will not sunport Peking in any action against Taiwan.
Actually, Moscow has mildly hinted that it would like to develop
unofficial contacts with the Nationalist Chinese.̂ 2 jn addition,
Japan has frequently stated that, "The maintenance of peace and security 
in the Taiwan area is a most important factor for the security of Japan. 
In essence, the four-power balance has created new constraints which 
enlarge the risks and costs that night be involved for Peking if it were 
to consider military action against Taiwan. Admittedly, there are 
several factors which could upset the emerging balance in Southeast Asia. 
In brief, a quadrilateral'relationship among the great powers is emerging 
in Southeast Asia somewhat simultaneously with Asian regionalism.
^2A. Doak Barnett, "The New Multipolar Balance in East Asia," The 
Annals, Vol. 390 (July, 1970), p. 78.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSIONS
Toward Non-al ignment 
The era of direct American presence and assistance in Southeast 
Asia seems to be ending. In countries such as Thailand and South 
Vietnam (which have depended on the U.S. for many decades) it is 
apparent that the U.S. is now looking to Asian leaders to seize the 
initiative and establish the economic and defense goals for their respec­
tive countries. To some extent progress is being made through regional 
economic and defense cooperation. Hov/ever̂  regiohalismis still in an 
infantile state and requires proper support of larger nations. Simul­
taneously emerging in the area is the quadrilateral balance comprised of 
the four great powers. If a stable and productive Southeast Asia is 
to evolve in the future then it would appear that these two forces 
must be compatible and not mutually exclusive.
The emergence of a quadrilateral balance in Southeast Asia may 
provide a background from which regionalism can make greater progress 
and achieve self-sufficiency if the great powers participate in a manner 
which does not rob the arrangement of its Southeast Asian character. 
Essentially, the main participants in the regional organizations must 
be the states of the region and the institutions created must be their 
own. There are several reasons for this. First, the anxieties of the 
new states concerning foreign intervention would be tempered and their
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self-respect strengthened. Further, a purely Asian arrangement would, 
be more responsive to nationalist demands for independence, equality, 
and status.
Second, this arrangement would hamper the widespread practice 
in Asia of requesting outside intervention in support of factions or 
states engaged in internal or international conflicts. Without imme- 
. diate outside support, the governments of Southeast Asia may be induced 
to rely increasingly upon themselves. They may, resultingly, devote their 
energies to internal development and subsequently, decrease "power 
vacuums." This safeguarding of orderly conditions in a region by the 
local states themselves will lessen the inducement or need for larger outside 
nations to become involved and the absence of outside influence may 
discourage intra-regional strife.
Obviously, a purely Asian arrangement will not be welcome to 
certain governments as their internal political security may be weakened 
without external support and the inability to play one outside nation 
against another may cause a decrease in the power of a certain state.
Yet, it would appear that these very roles are a major contributing 
factor to political unrest in Southeast Asia. Ending them is paramount 
for a more secure foundation for the region’s future. The existence 
of a government by the tie of complete' military and economic support 
• from an outside power is simply incompatible with nationalist sentiments 
. that Asian leaders instill in their people. .The. major-powers do not 
cherish this situation either and the U.S., China,, and the Soviet Union 
have all urged new states to insure their, viability by means of their
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own efforts.
The whole purpose of a future arrangement for Southeast Asia 
must be to enhance the viability of the states of the region— thus, 
the determination of the meaning of viability cannot be left to the 
determination of a certain government at a certain moment. Controversy 
and opposition will be barriers, on the path to a future Southeast Asian 
arrangement. Inevitably, innovations will hurt some and benefit others. 
Nevertheless, an Asian arrangement appears objectively as the most de­
sirable solution of the region's political problems from the standpoint 
of the Southeast Asian states, as such, and not any particular group 
%dthin them. The obvious prerequisite of success is ths.t the arrange­
ment be sufficiently attractive to enough leaders to serve the interests 
of the regional states— mainly, independent survival in a peaceful 
atmosphere.
The key element in the implementation of any arrangement is an 
organization of Southeast Asian states for close, often collective, 
cooperation in all field including military. The organization's political 
orientation must be toward non-alignment; it must not become part of any 
other regional organization or alliance system. Several organizations 
have been created since the.end of World War II, though fevr included 
military matters, and none passed the embryonic stage. The translation 
of good intentions into working systems has been prevented by emotional 
hostilities, nationalism and,so forth.. Regardless, these schemes \irere
^Werner Levi, "The Future of Southeast Asia," Asian Survey, 
Vol. 10, No. 4 (April, 1970), p. 352.
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indicative of a perceived need. ASEAN is the latest manifestation of 
this need but in contrast to other plans the talk surrounding ASEAN has 
included- military matters.
Regionalism Heeds Impetus 
Though this association has made strides in many areas, it has 
not as yet undertaken any military arrangements other than conferences.
It appears that regional cooperation needs added impetus in most areas 
and that several advantages need to be stressed to the leaders of the 
nations of the area. One general advantage from a regional organization 
would be the breaking of a vicious circle that has throttled the states 
of the region since independence. There has been an acute lack of 
— machinery available to settle -peacefully the many conflicts "disturbing 
regional relations; yet no machinery has been created because of these 
many conflicts. The only systems for conflict resolution at the states’ ■ 
disposal is either global organizations or organizations with an Asian 
focus in which non-Asian nations participate.
Suspicion and distrust many times prevents the regional states 
from seriously considering the use of these organizations for conflict 
resolution. Certain states argue that non-Asians cannot understand the 
culture-bound character of their conflicts and thus, cannot contribute 
to their resolve. For example, it is difficult to settle major ter­
ritorial claims, which .originated in defunct pre-colonial institutions, 
with the rules of a twentieth century legal system. It is even more 
frustrating to attempt to resolve political tensions based on Confucian 
or other Asian concepts (such as tribute paying) with the help of a
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modern international system within which much concepts are archaic or 
unknown. Thus, an Asian regional organization, could supplement global 
institutions, and at the same time satisfy Asian demands by suggesting 
solutions of conflicts and,, further, by suggesting solutions of problems 
before they become conflicts. This would be done by methods adjusted 
to the needs of Asians and acceptable to them.
A second advantage of regional organizations which should be 
stressed is the opportunity afforded representatives of regional states 
to join in frequent and informed meetings. In this situation, they 
would not feel the need to individually maintain a status of equality and 
prestige with the mors powerful nations and would not have to fear "neo-col­
onial” schemes or other conspiracies behind proposals of an economic or   .
political nature. Further, they would not have to attempt to outdo each 
other in either wooing or dondemning outsiders. Rather, they could devote 
themselves to constructive discussions of common problems and ways of 
solving them. Last, they could overcome mutual ignorance which has pre­
viously contributed to the perpetuation of age-old animosities and a 
complete absence of common effort. Subsequently, political tension could 
be reduced and political cooperation improved.
Another advantage would be the increase in political influence 
for each state through common action. Economic development could be 
furthered through coordinated planning and joint execution of common 
programs. Ifnen economic aid is given and received for truly.economic 
purposes, its value could be enhanced by channeling it through the or­
ganization; where it is intended for political purposes the organization 
could make:it'less■risky. Many of these points have been clearly.
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recognized by many regional states. However, plans for economic 
cooperation are less likely to occur under adverse political circumstances. 
The reverse may be true as veil. A regional organisation must deal with 
all areas of international relations. Only a comprehensive organization 
can, in the long ruin, ameliorate the disturbing influence of one area 
upon another. Only in a comprehensive organization can the full advantage 
of success in one area be made to benefit all the other areas.
There is no assumption here that creation of an all-encompassing 
regional organization is an easy matter. There are numerous obstacles to 
overcome. Nationalist feelings still run high in many countries, and 
the people have yet to develop a group identity as Southeast Asians.
The personal ambitions of certain leaders and inexperience in regional  ..
intercourse are additional limitations and there are others that could 
be mentioned. However, the importance of emotionally conditioned in­
terests may fade in the wake of immediate and vital problems that are 
constantly demanding solutions. The attraction of a regional organization 
is that it can satisfy some of the emotional needs as well as the physical 
needs.
Support of Great Powers Needed 
Many of the governments in Southeast Asia are aware of this 
potential but are hesitant because of uncertainty concerning the oosi- 
tions of major powers. In brief, the great powers, especially the 
United States and Soviet Union could hasten the process of regionalism.
The self-denial that would be demanded of these powers could be expected 
only if they considered an independent, comprehensive organization ad-
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vantageous to themselves. There is some evidence to indicate that they 
do consider such an organization advantageous. Both are attempting to 
prevent one nation from dominating the area and have primarily directed 
their efforts toward China. In Southeast Asia, as in other parts of the 
world, non-aligned states can act as buffers between these two major 
powers as well as between either of them and China,
As previously mentioned, the United States has consistently 
supported moves for regional organizations and welcomed the creation 
of ASSAN. Limiting China's power through a regional organization would 
cater to the basic U.S. policy of preventing one nation from dominating 
the area. The Soviet Union, by developing closer relations with many
of the states of the area, already has-made her interest known. From  -
the strictly American viewpoint, the filling of any vacuum by a regional 
organization rather than Soviets may be preferable but it may not be 
unrealistic to assume that they may be preferable to the Soviets as well.
The Soviets, like the United States, are primarily concerned with 
preventing China from filling any position the American and British 
withdrawals from the area might leave open. Presumably, the Soviets 
most likely would not cherish (any more than the U.S.) the idea of being 
the "Marshall Dillon" of Southeast Asia but are actively engaged in the 
political isolation and even the military encirclement of China. 
Brezhnev’s suggestion for a collective security system for Southeast 
Asia-indicates that the creation of a regional organization is at least 
a possibility for Soviet policy.
Peking’s attitude toward any regional organization is much more 
difficult to project. If Peking were faced with haveiny to accent the
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best possible rather than an ideal arrangement it might be reconciled 
to the existence of a regional organization. There seems little doubt 
that China would interpret such an organization,as directed specifically 
against her and would be partially correct. Most likely Peking would 
prefer hegemony over at least parts of Southeast Asia and likely will, 
in the long run, aim at it. In the meantime, China has made no open 
moves to expand beyond small border areas. She has made it clear that 
Worth Korea and Worth Vietnam are considered vital for security, and she 
would not tolerate the physical presence of an outside power0
These border areas are undoubtedly considered to constitute China’s 
sphere of influence, and it is likely that the closer the spheres of
other nations are located to those of China, the tighter control that---
Peking would want over its sphere. The existence of a wide non-aligned 
grouping in Southeast Asia could actually alleviate Chinese fears by 
broadening her security belt. The bargain for China would be to trade 
a relatively firm control over immediate border areas for a lesser in­
fluence in a much wider buffer zone. Peking would also have to be make 
aware that the organization could hardly be a threat to her security.
At best, it would be a defense system in relation to China, and even its 
deterrent effect might be inadequate without the assistance of outsiders.
In any event, the American disengagement is unlikely to open new 
possibilities for Chinese expansion since the Soviets are already 
foreclosing on them vrith a small but active presence. The Chinese may 
dislike a Soviet penetration even more than an American one. The pros­
pect of the U.S. and the Soviets implementing their policies in a manner 
to thwart Peking's influence must be a ‘nightmare to the Chinese, For
77
these reasons, Peking may be much less reluctant to accept a regional 
organization that would temper the American, Soviet and Japanese as well 
as a Chinese penetration of Southeast Asia. These are mere optimistic 
speculations, concerning great power policies that may ensue,,
Hoxvever, it seems clear that an effective regional organization 
requires the tolerance of the great powers and prefereably their co­
operation. This is not only true in the sense that major powers must 
refrain from destroying the organization but also in the sense that 
their positive support may well be indispensable during an organization's 
birth as well as to its ultimate survival. Indeed, it seems apparent 
that the prospect of outside help for Southeast Asian enterprises, es­
pecially economic, has been one of the incentives -to -regional-coopera-___
tion. In view of the enormous needs of the region for future development, 
this fact is likely to remain for several decades. This may be one of 
the effective tools available to outsiders to encourage and reinforce 
the trend tovjard regional cooperation,.
Obviously, none of the major powers would tolerate the organiza­
tion if it was considered to be the product of one of them. Thus, all 
outside support must be so organized that neither the non-aligned nor the 
Asian character of the organization is endangered. This condition could 
be best fulfilled if the support is channeled through an international 
agency rather than through any one member directly. Agreement among 
outsiders on this is paramount as the temptation of regional states will 
be great to circumvent it. Many of the -states in the area have already 
been reported as welcoming an intensification of the power struggle in 
the area on the ground that this enlarges their leeway for political •
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maneuvering. With the entry of the Soviets, new opportunities of this 
type develop.
If a regional organization exploits the presence of a great 
power, no great harm appears manifest. In contrast, if individual states 
attempt to do so, the organization may be destined for an early demise 
as the situation that initially made the organization necessary would 
have been recreated. A further improvement in the organization's results 
might be achieved if the needed outside support would come from an 
Asian or smaller Western nation. As previously mentioned, Japan is 
actively engaged in furthering the regional cooperation trend in Asia 
and during the past few years has stimulated regional arrangements. A 
comprehensive regional organization would seem to be in accord with 
Toayo’s. policies and under proper circumstances, Japan might play an 
instrumental role.
William P. Bundy has set forth five "conditions for lasting 
peace"1- in Southeast Asia, and they seem to culminate with the conclusion 
of a non-aligned regional organization for the area. These conditions 
respond to the desires of Southeast Asians, while at the same time being 
compatible xd.th the interests and interactions of the great powers. First, 
and foremost, the preservation of the independence of the individual 
nations is paramount. Second, a continued and improved rate of economic 
progress. Third, the fullest possible cooperation among the Southeast
. ^William P. Bundy, "New Tides in Southeast Asia," Foreign Affairs. 
(January, 1971), p. 192.
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Asian nations. Fourth, which Bundy refers to as a "common lav; of change"-̂  
simply means that the nations of an area are the initial judges of 
whether change and the use of violence or force of any kind are or are 
not fair and tolerable— and, thus, are or are not to be opposed or sup­
ported by outside nations.
The fifth condition is the correct behavior of the great powers. 
Optimistically, this should consist of a guarantee among interested 
outside powers that they will not interfere by military or subversive 
means in the area, and acting on the finding of the local jury, will 
join together against an outside power or local nation that does. This 
is easier to say than do. If a great-power make? Bundy feels a "self- 
imposed law of behavior"^ and maintaining equilibrium. The former is 
simply a code of conduct 'which bars great-power pressure and aggression 
and subversion. The latter is that no power should threaten to dominate. 
The first three conditions appear to be at least in the developmental 
stages but the last two are dependent on the actions of the great powers.
Thus, in broad outline, are the desirable directions for the future 
development of international politics in Southeast Asia. A regional 
organization is far from an ideal solution but may have promise for 
a durable peace, and further, it lies within the framework of past and 
present policies conducted by the regional states as well as several 
major powers. Many of the states of the area are committed to such an
^Bundy, "New Tides in Southeast Asia," p. 193. 
h b i d ., p. 194.
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organization and their inability to transform intentions into reality 
may be overcome gradually by the pressures produced from the power 
struggles of the great powers. Non-cooperation was a luxury that South- 
east Asian nations could afford as long as Asia was a non-man’s land 
for the external world*
However, the risks for each state of non-cooperation are rapidly 
increasing. Many of the leaders do not enjoy being a battle ground of 
the major powers and a conviction is gaining among then that a position 
outside the sphere of influence of any one of the major powers is a de- 
sireable goal for them all-and this includes North Vietnam, South Vietnam 
or even a United Vietnam. Similarly, the Soviet Union, United States,
-.and Japan would seem to share this position and-it is conceivable that- -.
China may be persuaded to accept it as well. The most promising way to 
reach this goal appears to be through the creation of a non-aligned 
comprehensive organization in Southeast Asia«
"Whether or not a regional organization can develop fully in 
Southeast Asia depends to a great extent on the actions of the nations 
that are a part of the new quadrilateral balance emerging in the area.
The chances of achieving regional cooperation are real, and the strides 
already taken are significant, but the great powers must allow Southeast 
Asian hands to shape the Southeast Asian future. The great-power role 
must be one of a secondary nature in comparison to the nations of the 
area.
Today a Southeast Asia, there appears to be a convergence of 
factors that appear to be highly favorable to the United States. Pre­
cisely at a time, when Americans are most anxious to reduce their some-
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what unilateral role in Asian affairs, nations like Japan have begun to 
achieve major economic output and nations like Thailand, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore have at least begun to espouse a 
political outlook that makes the concept of burden-sharing applicable,.
If Southeast Asians can be encouraged and helped to assume more of the 
burdens for their development and security, it is not unlikely that at 
least a partial buffer will have been created between the United States 
and China.
Circumstances are now appropriate for Southeast Asian peoples 
to be encouraged to rely less upon American guarantees and more upon 
themselves. Also from the U.S. standpoint, it must be faced that the
power to effect'ba'sic change"In the" area“is' limited;“-In the -words of---
David Mozingo, ’’The power fundamentally to change the basic indigenous 
forces shaping the development and character of nationalism in Southeast 
Asian countries lies neither in Peking nor Washington.Mozingo also 
states:
The fear, expressed in the argument that neutralism or 
nonalignment is simply a temporary way station on the 
road to communisem, that Peking and other communists can 
push over popular nationalist regimes like dominoes once 
a Communist revolution succeeds somewhere else, is over­
whelmingly contradicted by the proven vitality of Asian 
nationalism in the last twenty years.116
If the major powers are truly limited by nationalism then this is simply
^David Mozingo, "Containment in Asia Reconsidered," World Politics. 
Vol. 19, No. 3 (April, 1967), p. 377.
6Ibid., p. 373.
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an additional incentive, one for the shaping of the Asian future by 
Asian hands*
Though this study has presented some quite optimistic speculations 
concerning the actions of the great powers in the future structure 
of Southeast Asia, these were mere "food for thought*" For, in reality, 
it seems clear that the future will rest on the two pillars: the col­
lective interests of the Southeast Asian nations acting in regional 
groupings, and the policies of the four powers who comprise the quadri­
lateral balance* The major elements of this structure seem clear* How­
ever, the relationship of them to each other is far from clear and will 
depend largely upon decisions which are still to be made*
If the great powers utilize a less direct and more restrained  .
approach to the area so as to encourage and sustain regionalism, self- 
reliance and Asian initiatives, then the construction of a stable interna­
tional order in the area may be forthcoming* If the opposite conditions 
ensue whereby great powers continue to play a direct meddling role, then 
the most gross type of instability and lack of unity in the area will 
likely prevail in conjunction with the veils of colonialism. Active 
regionalism is one of the new realities of Southeast Asia and one of 
the more promising vehicles for the nations of the area to maintain their 
independence, unity, economic growth and self-respect in the midst of 
great power presence. Obviously, whether or not this avenue is allowed 
to flourish will be dependent to a degree on the great powers; they must 
allow Asian hands to play the primary role in the shaping of the Asian 
future. The great powers can play an important secondary role, but it 
must remain secondary and supporting.
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It would seem that the major powers whould all share several 
basic interests in the area. First, today because of the dangerous 
imbalance between population and wealth, and because of the pressures 
to achieve equality with the Northern nations, Southeast Asia is a some­
what explosively unstable part of the world. Though far away from the 
United States, fires in Southeast Asia could lead to greater conflagra­
tions. Therefore, the great powers must attempt to bring the area closer 
to prosperity, peace, and stability.
Second, the great powers appear to share in the future of the 
area. One day the nations of the area will be much more powerful than 
they are today. If this power is directed .toward non-cooperative ag­
gressive behavior, then it could threaten world peace. If it is oriented 
toward cooperation and more peaceful undertakings, then it will be much 
less of a threat. The great powers have an important stake in the future 
of the area— twenty or even fifty years from now.
Last, though it might sound somewhat unscholarly, it would seem 
that there is a moral imperative to help those in need. In a broader 
context, it seems that it will be more and more difficult for the world 
to continue half poor and half rich, half in turmoil and half at peace0 
These nations which remain poor and impoverished will be a continuing 
drain on the rest of the world. An unhappy, turbulent and war-torn area 
will be a threat to all. The great powers should share the interest of 
helping deprived areas become healthy parts of the world in which we live.
Thus, the great powers have important interests in the future of 
the structure which is now emerging in Southeast Asia. How they adjust
to that structure may determine the stability or instability of the 
area for many decades. The time has arrived-when we must now turn 
our thoughts beyond the Vietnam quagmire and begin thinking more of the 
future of the entire Southeast Asia area and to the two-pillared structure 
which is emerging*
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